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THE UNGRATEFUL LIVING

I. INTRODUCTION

"If I had the World to give
The GratefulDead
The advantage of estate planning is that the testator2 can be assured
his assets will pass at his death to those whom he intends to benefit in
the manner in which he chooses to benefit them. Since it rarely happens
that the decedent will have left his estate in a manner that will entirely
please all of his family or friends, this article is intended to assist the
draftsman as well as the litigant in protecting the client's estate plan.
The article will first focus on the effect of the statutory protections
extended to surviving spouses, such as the elective share, homestead
exemption and family allowance. Factual patterns that portend a high
risk of contest are identified. The article will then review dispositive provisions, choice of instrument, and formalities of execution to reduce the
likelihood of a successful challenge to the estate plan. The grounds for
upsetting wills, as well as inter vivos instruments such as deeds and trusts,
are explored in depth. The procedure for will contests, and evidentiary
questions such as admissibility and burden of proof, are discussed. Finally,
the author reviews trial strategies that the contestant's attorney may
want to employ and which counsel for the proponent should be prepared
for. While cases from jurisdictions other than Wyoming will be cited, the
main emphasis of the article will be on the rather substantial body of
Wyoming cases that have dealt with these issues.3
II.

DEFUSING THE FORCED SHARE AND SPOUSAL SUPPORT PROVISIONS

"I Used to Love Her"
The Grateful Dead
Intentionally omitting a spouse is made difficult by the the spousal
support4 and the elective share (or the forced share)5 provisions. However,
a careful draftsman can avoid these provisions if the testator wishes.
1. Titles to the Grateful Dead songs throughout this article can be found in P. GRUSH-

&J. GRUSHKIN, GRATEFUL DEAD: THE OFFICIAL BOOK OF THE DEAD HEADS
156-65 (1983).
2. For simplicity's sake, the author uses the masculine gender when referring to the
person for whom the estate planning is done and the female gender when referring to a surviving spouse.
3. There are twenty-seven Wyoming cases cited in this article dealing with just the
KIN, C. BASSETT

issues of testamentary capacity and undue influence. At first blush this may seem remarkable considering the usual lack of depth of case law in Wyoming. Possible explanations for
the large number of decisions in Wyoming in this area are: (i)will contests are often decided

on circumstantial evidence which, depending on the facts, may lead to different outcomes
on only slightly different fact patterns; (ii) the emotion of a will contest does not let the unsuccessful party, either proponent or contestant, easily accept the trial court's verdict, and (iii)

the all-or-nothing stakes involved in a will contest may invite appeals.
4. WYO. STAT. §§ 2-7-501 (1977, Rev. 1980), 2-7-502 (1977, Rev. 1980) and 2-7-504 (1977
& Cum. Supp. 1988).
5. WYO. STAT. § 2-5-101 (1977, Rev. 1980).
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1989
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A. Spousal Support Provisions
The spousal support provisions include an allowance for maintenance
for the surviving spouse,6 the homestead exemption and exempt property
set aside,' and the temporary right of possession to the homestead, family
wearing apparel and all household furniture of the decedent.8
In Wyoming the spousal support provisions can constitute an estate
plan by rule of law for smaller estates. Wyoming Statute section 2-7-5081
provides for a homestead exemption of $30,000. This amount is exempt
from the payment of all debts of the decedent other than administration
expenses and expenses of the decedent's funeral." If the decedent is survived by minor children none of whom are the children of the surviving
spouse, then the survivor only receives fifty percent of the amount set
aside to satisfy the homestead exemption with the other fifty percent
going to the decedent's minor children. In all other cases the surviving
spouse may elect to receive all of the equity in the home, up to the $30,000
maximum.
B. The Elective (Forced)Share
All but one of the common law states1 give the surviving spouse an
election either to take those assets which she would receive by the terms
of the will or to renounce the will and receive a statutory share. Wyoming's
elective share is one-half of the decedent's estate if the decedent has no
surviving issue or the spouse is the parent of any of the surviving issue
of the decedent. In all other cases the spouse's elective share is one-fourth.' 2
In Wyoming the elective share applies to all property, subject to disposition under the will, remaining after funeral and administrative
expenses, homestead allowance, family allowances and exemption, and
enforceable claims are satisifed. Prior to its amendment in 1980 the Wyoming elective share provisions applied to the "estate, real and personal."' 3
This raised the question whether property which might be subject to
testamentary disposition, through a power of appointment,' would be sub6. WYO.STAT. § 2-7-502 (1977, Rev. 1980). This support provision accompanies the
right to temporary possession, Wyo. STAT. § 2-7-501 (1977, Rev. 1980). It is not clear from
the statute whether this support provision can extend beyond the date when the inventory
is filed. If it must cease at the date of filing the inventory, then it appears there would be
no support available to the family once the inventory is returned but the appraisement has
not been filed.
7. WYo. STAT. § 2-7-504 (1977 & Cum. Supp. 1988).
8. WYO. STAT. § 2-7-501 (1977, Rev. 1980). This right of temporary possession is only
to last until the inventory is returned.
9. WYo. STAT. § 2-7-508 (1977, Rev. 1980).
10. WYo. STAT. § 2-7-504 (1977 & Cum. Supp. 1988) was amended in 1981 to take out
the former reference to last illness and funeral expenses. Now only the administrative expenses
and funeral expenses take priority over the homestead and other exemptions.
11. Georgia does not provide for elective share. GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-9 (1982).
12. WYO. STAT. § 2-5-101 (1977, Rev. 1980).
13. WYo. STAT. § 2-5-101 (1977, Rev. 1980).
14. A power of appointment is the right given to a donee, the powerholder, to designate the transferees of the property which is the subject of the power, or the shares or interests
the transferees will take in such property. Powers of appointment are usually classified as
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ject to the elective share. In Reno v. Reno," the court held that property
over which the decedent held a power of appointment was not included
among the assets to which the surviving spouse's elective share extended. 6
A good argument could be made to limit the holding in Reno to its
facts and to apply a different rule to an exercised testamentary general
power of appointment. The creditors of the holder of an exercised general
power of appointment can reach that property to the extent of their
claims.17 This makes the transfer of property by appointment under a
testamentary general power of appointment more of a "disposition under
the will" than a special power of appointment.
C. Damage Control-PlanningWithin the Will
Since the elective share applies after the homestead exemption, exempt
property and family allowances are set aside, the amount which the electing spouse can take can be a very high percentage of the total estate, particularly in smaller estates. The Wyoming statutes 8 offer a very limited
planning opportunity within the will. The decedent can, through a clear
expression, provide a bequest to the surviving spouse in lieu of these
rights. If there is such a bequest, then the surviving spouse is not entitled to these rights unless she renounces the provisions made for her
benefit under the will. The application of this planning opportunity can
best be illustrated by two examples. First, the testator may make a gift
to his spouse in lieu of her homestead right because he wants his home
to pass to his children. He could specify that the bequest to her of $30,000
in cash is in lieu of her homestead right. If she wanted the home, she would
have to renounce the cash gift. Alternatively, the testator could leave
property in trust under the will, which exceeds in amount the total of the
elective share and the homestead exemption, exempt property and family
allowances amount. The trust, however, would be subject only to a lifetime right to income in the surviving spouse, with the remainder to pass
general or special. A general power of appointment is a "power exercisable in favor of the
decedent, his estate, his creditors or the creditors of his estate." I.R.C. § 2041(b) (West Supp.
1986). A special power of appointment is a power not exercisable in favor of the powerholder,
his estate, his creditors or the creditors of his estate. A power of appointment can be testamentary, that is exercisable by the powerholder's last will and testament, or inter vivos. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY

1054 (5th ed. 1979).

15. 626 P.2d 552 (Wyo. 1981).
16. In Reno the court noted that the 1980 amendments to the Wyoming Probate Code
had changed the language of the elective share provisions, but in dicta expressed the opinion that "the change in the statute in no way affects the result of this case; it being the
same under either." Id at 552 n.1. This is troubling because the language under the amended
probate code says the elective share applies to "the property which is subject to disposition
under the will." Wyo. STAT. § 2-5-101 (1977, Rev. 1980). Arguably the reach of the new elective share is broader than the old statute and begs application to testamentary powers of
appointment. Since Floyd Reno died in 1976 and the outcome of Reno was determined under
the more restrictive language of the old probate code, it seems the issue of whether the elective share under the current probate code applies to testamentary powers of appointment
is still an open question in Wyoming. Furthermore, it should be noted that in Reno the power
was a special power and was never exercised. Reno, 626 P.2d at 555.
17. SIMEs & SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS, § 945, at 403-04 (2d ed. 1956).
18. WYo. STAT. § 2-5-103 (1977, Rev. 1980).
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upon the survivor's death to the testator's children. The gift in trust for
the survivor's benefit must include a statement that it is made "in lieu"
of the rights granted the survivor, and the survivor must choose between
a lifetime income or the smaller fractional share of the decedent's estate
that would be the survivor's under the elective share, homestead exemption, exempt property and family allowance provision. For larger estates
this technique is useful for estate tax purposes as the gift in trust could
be to a QTIP 19 marital trust so as to generate a marital deduction for the
testator's estate.
Another planning possibility is to have the husband and wife enter
into a contract to make joint or mutual wills. Typically, such a contract
would provide that upon the first spouse's death all of their property would
pass to the surviving spouse. The will would then provide for distribution of the assets to their intended beneficiaries once both of them were
deceased. This approach does avoid problems with the spousal support
provisions and elective share since all of the couple's property passes at
the first spouse's death to the survivor. However, it is not a satisfactory
solution where one of the spouses is considerably younger than the other
and the older spouse doesn't want to make his children, who may be older
than the new spouse, wait until the death of the younger spouse to enjoy
any of papa's assets. It is also of limited utility in smaller estates if the
surviving spouse seeks to break the contract by renouncing the will and
taking the spousal support provisions and elective share, leaving little
if anything for the deceased spouse's beneficiaries. 20
D. Avoidance Through Trusts and Other Will Substitutes
The Wyoming Probate Code only provides an elective share for
"property which is subject to disposition under the will;" 2' therefore, it
appears that transfers of property not included in the probate estate, or
at least over which the decedent doesn't have the right to dispose of via
testamentary appointment through his will, aren't subject to the elective
share. The legislative history of the new Wyoming Probate Code seems
to support such a position.
The new Wyoming Probate Code was adopted after a special committee was appointed by Governor Herschler to study the issue of revising
the old probate code. The study was prompted by the 1970 publication
of the Uniform Probate Code (U.P.C.) by the Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, and by literature which highlighted the advantages the U.P.C.
19. I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7) (West Supp. 1986) allows a marital deduction for "qualified terminable interest" property which has been given the acronym QTIP. To qualify for the QTIP
election, three requirements must be met: (1)the spouse must be entitled to all income from
the interest for her life; (2)the income must be payable to her no less frequently than annually; and (3) no one may have the power to appoint the property during the spouse's lifetime
to anyone other than the spouse.
20. For a more detailed discussion of enforceability of contracts to dispose of property
at the death of two or more testators, see text discussion at II.C.
21. WYo. STAT. § 2-5-101(a) (1977, Rev. 1980).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol24/iss2/8
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offered over the old Wyoming Probate Code. 2 There was a groundswell
of support for the U.P.C., initially evidenced by the fact that it was23
adopted in substantial form by all of the states which border Wyoming.
The new Wyoming Probate Code was forged from a wide array of
sources. Most of its provisions were taken from the old Wyoming Probate Code, which had been adopted originally from California. Some of
its provisions were taken from Iowa.2 ' Other provisions were adapted verbatim from the U.P.C., and others with either technical or grammatical
changes. Finally, in some cases, and most notably in the case of the elective share, the drafters of the new Wyoming Probate Code used their own
language.
The U.P.C. approach to the elective share is what is known as the augmented estate concept, which provides that nonprobate assets are subject to the elective share. 21 It is clear that the drafters of the new Wyoming
Probate Code had the opportunity to incorporate into Wyoming's probate code the augmented estate concept and chose not to do so. For example, Wyoming Statute section 2-5-101(a)26 (which defines what property
is subject to the elective share and what that share amounts to) and section 2-5-101(d) 27 (which deals with the effect of a failure to make a timely
election) are both original to the new Wyoming Probate Code. In contrast
Wyoming statutes section 2-5-101(b) 28 (dealing with choice of law provi22. See Averill, Wyoming's Law of Decedent's Estates,Guardianshipand Trusts: A
Comparison with the Uniform Probate Code Part 1, 7 LAND & WATER L. REV. 169 (1972);
PartI, 8 LAND & WATER L. REV. 187 (1973); PartIII, 9 LAND & WATER L. REV. 567 (1974);
and Part IV, 10 LAND & WATER L. REV. 155 (1975).
23. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-10-101 to 15-17-101 (1973); IDAHO CODE §§ 15-1-101 to

15-7-307 (1971 &Cum. Supp. 1988); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 72-1-101 to 72-5-502, and §§ 72-16-601
to 72-16-612 (1974); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30-2201 to 30-2902 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1987); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 75-1-101 to 75-8-101 (1975 & Cum. Supp. 1988). South Dakota had adopted
the U.P.C. but repealed it on February 17, 1976.
24. The stimulus for adopting portions of the Iowa probate was most likely Roy Stoddard, Esq., a Cheyenne attorney who chaired the Governor's Probate Revision Committee's
efforts. Mr. Stoddard had practiced in Iowa for many years before coming to Wyoming, where
he has been in private practice emphasizing estate planning and administration, and has
taught at the University of Wyoming Law School.
25. Section 2-201(a) of the Uniform Probate Code allows a decedent's spouse to claim
an elective share in an amount equal to one-third of the decedent's augmented estate, whether
the decedent died with or without a will. The augmented estate is comprised of the decedent's net probate estate plus (1) the value of certain lifetime transfers of property by the
decedent during marriage to donees other than the surviving spouse and (2) the value of
all property owned by the surviving spouse at decedent's death as well as certain lifetime
transfers of property by the surviving spouse during marriage to donees other than the decedent, to the extent that the owned or transferred property was derived from the decedent.
U.P.C. § 2-202 (1983). The objective of the Uniform Probate Code's elective share was to
protect the surviving spouse while balancing the interests of allowing the decedent freedom
of testation and the interests of other donees. The complexity of this approach, in terms
of having to trace gifts and the origin of property ownership by the surviving spouse, has
made it quite controversial. For an excellent discussion of the augmented estate concept,
see Kurtz, The Augmented Estate Concept Under the Uniform Probate Code: In Search of
an Equitable Elective Share, 62 IOWA L. REV. 981 (1977).

26. WYo.
27. WYo.
28. WYo.

STAT.
STAT.
STAT.

§ 2-5-101(a) (1977, Rev. 1980).

§ 2-5-101(d) (1977, Rev. 1980).

§ 2-5-101(b) (1977, Rev. 1980).
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sions affecting the elective share when the decedent is not a domiciliary
of Wyoming) is taken verbatim from the U.P.C."
The elimination, either intentional or unintentional, of the surviving
spouse's elective share through nonprobate assets was the very reason
for the U.P.C.'s augmented estate concept. The significance of the Wyoming legislature's rejection of the augmented estate concept is that a Wyoming domiciliary can defeat the elective share by removing his property
from the probate estate; through inter vivos trusts, joint tenancies, life
insurance, annuities, and lifetime gifts. The surviving spouse who feels
she has been victimized by such planning may attempt to set aside the
transfers. The grounds for doing so could be that the transfers were (1)
31
"illusory," 30 (2) a fraud on the spouse's marital rights, or (3) testamentary in nature and fail because they weren't executed with the formali32
ties required of a will. No Wyoming cases have reached these issues.
III.

MAKING THE ESTATE PLAN IMPREGNABLE

"My Time Comin' Any Day"
The Grateful Dead
A. Warning Signs
Certain situations should immediately flag danger of a contest. If the
attorney is aware of these patterns the estate planning conference can
be used not only to elicit the client's testamentary objectives but also to
discuss the techniques for minimizing post-mortem conflict. These situations include: a desire to limit the gift to or disinherit a spouse; total disinheritance of a child or children; disparate treatment of children; children
from a prior marriage; dead-hand control through conditional gifts; "locking up" the assets through trusts; and nonfamily gifts.
Even when these patterns aren't present the suggestions for will execution ceremonies, document preservation, choice of instrument and
applicable law, and selection of fiduciaries discussed below will assist the
planner in making sure that the client's testamentary wishes are fulfilled.
29. U.P.C. § 2-201(b) (1983).
30. "Deceiving by false appearances; nominal, as distinguished from substantial.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 674 (5th ed.
32 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 193 (1958).

"

1979). See Powell, Illusory Transfersand Section 18,

31. For a case in which the surviving spouse raised the doctrine of fraud on marital
rights, see Methodist Episcopal Church v. Hadfield, 453 A.2d 145 (Md. App. 1982). In this
case the wife was advised by her therapist to seek employment. She withdrew the savings
she had brought into the marriage from a joint bank account with her husband after he started
charging her 14 cents a mile for using the family automobile to commute to work. The husband then called her a "robber" and a "thief" and deeded a remainder interest in their residence, which was titled in his sole name as a result of an inheritance from his first wife, to
his church. At his death his will left little to his widow and she sought to have the lifetime
conveyance of the home set aside on the grounds it had been fraudulent. The appeals court
felt her claim of fraud might be upheld but remanded the case to the lower court for further
determinations.
32. For a discussion of the different approaches that other jurisdictions have taken to
these attacks by a surviving spouse on efforts to avoid those spousal rights, see Schuyler,
Revocable Trusts-Spouses,Creditors and OtherPredators,8 INsT. ON EST. PLAN 1300 (1974).
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1. The Wicked Stepmother or Stepfather
When the spousal support provisions are combined with the elective
share, there may be little left of the probate estate to pass on to the testator's children. When the testator's children are also the surviving spouse's
children this isn't a serious concern. But in the so-called "wicked stepparent" situation, the homestead exemption and the other spousal support provisions present special problems. Estate planning for the married
client with children from a prior marriage also requires careful consideration of how jointly held property will interface with the testamentary plan
embodied in the will.
The "home on the range" problem is the legal effect which the
homestead exemption granted to a surviving spouse will have on the testator's personal residence. The largest source of equity in many testator's
estates is the home. As discussed above, 3 the surviving spouse is given
the right to ask the probate court to set over for her benefit the personal
residence, or if it exceeds $30,000 in value, a specific portion thereof. If
she is a stepmother of the decedent's minor child or children, then she4
is only entitled to one-half of the homestead and other exempt assets.
In Wyoming, the probate court will, in determining the surviving
spouse's entitlement to the homestead exemption, take into account a
jointly owned residence which passed to the survivor at the decedent's
death by operation of law.3 5 If the testator doesn't want his personal residence to be divided between his surviving spouse and his minor children,
none of whom are the children of the survivor, and who do not reside with
her, then he may want to attempt to avoid the homestead exemption by
titling that property in joint ownership."
In the case of older clients with children from prior marriages, the
testator may want to pass his home to his adult children. He should be
informed that despite the language of his will and the fact that he has
maintained title in his sole name, his widow will have a right to have the
homestead exemption set-aside for her benefit. He may then choose to
title the home jointly with his children, convey a remainder interest to
the children while reserving only a life estate for his benefit, or create a
revocable or irrevocable trust. Since these techniques will leave no interest
in the home in his probate estate, they should avoid the effects of the
homestead exemption.
In this situation the client should also consider, as additional protection, requesting his spouse to waive her rights to the homestead andlor
33. WYo. STAT. § 2-7-504 (1977 & Cum. Supp. 1988).
34. WYo. STAT. § 2-7-504 (1977 & Cum. Supp. 1988).
35. Wambeke v. Hopkin, 372 P.2d 470, 474 (Wyo. 1962). Although this case was decided
prior to the revision of the Wyoming Probate Code, presumably the same law would apply
since the homestead exemption was only modified grammatically and not substantively.
36. A trust might be considered if the client wants to be sure that the house passes
to his children at the survivor's death. However, the practicalities of a trust with just the
decedent's home in it are questionable. Additionally, a tenancy by the entireties ownership
will offer greater protection against creditors during the client's lifetime than will a trust.
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right to election.3 7 This waiver must be obtained only after "fair disclosure." It can be done after marriage, although the client should be
encouraged to raise this issue prior to saying "I do" at the altar.
The client must be advised on the effects of retirement plans and insurance benefits. The spousal consent provisions of the Retirement Equity
Act" substantially restrict the client's ability to use his retirement plan
benefits as a means of leaving assets to his children. There is no restriction on the client's designation of his insurance and annuity benefits.
However, if the potential beneficiaries are minor children or spendthrifts
the client may want to consider making those proceeds payable to a trust.
If a testamentary trust is used, the benefits should be payable directly
to the trustees of the trust rather than having them paid to the probate
estate where they will
be subject to the elective share and the spousal
39
support provisions.
2. The Forgotten or Despised Child
Omitted children frequently receive legislative protection. Wyoming
offers a modest measure of protection to minor children through the family
allowance'0 and the homestead exemption," but statutory protection for
adult children who are either forgotten or intentionally disinherited is conspicuously absent. Wyoming, Kansas, and the District of Columbia are
the only jurisdictions in the nation which do not have some form of pretermitted heir statute.'4 The testator who intentionally disinherits a child
will find Wyoming a favorable domicile.
Even though Wyoming has no pretermitted heir statute, estate planning clients are often mobile, and the prudent attorney will inquire into
the existence of children, whether they will be beneficiaries or not. The
draftsman should include each child's name in the will and affirmatively
declare the testator's intent not to leave anything to the disinherited
child."
37. WYo. STAT. § 2-5-102 (1977, Rev. 1980).
38. The spouse's consent must be obtained to have a payout other than a qualified joint
and survivor annuity or qualified preretirement survivor annuity. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1055(c)(2)
(West 1985).
39. It may be preferable to use an inter vivos insurance trust for this purpose since
there is no case law in Wyoming yet to support the proposition that a testamentary trust
is not subject to the elective share.
40. WYO. STAT. § 2-7-502 (1977, Rev. 1980).
41. WYo. STAT. § 2-7-501 (1977, Rev. 1980).
42. ATKINSON, WILLS 141 (2d Ed. 1953); DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS,
AND ESTATES 623 n.137. The pretermitted heir statutes are generally of two classes: those

which protect only those children who are born or adopted after the will is executed and
those which protect any child who isn't mentioned in the will. If a testator fails to mention
a child who falls in the class protected by the jurisdiction's statutes, then the usual remedy

is to give the omitted child an intestate share while letting the balance of the will stand.

43. This practice will not only protect against the client dying in a state that does have
a pretermitted heir statute but it is also helpful in probate practice because it preserves in

the will a readily available list of the "heirs" to whom the notices required under Wyo.

STAT.

§ 2-7-205 (1980) must be sent.

44. Some courts have ruled that to disinherit a child the intention to disinherit must

be manifested affirmatively rather than negatively. In re Estate of Padilla, 641 P.2d 539,
544 (N.M. App. 1982).
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Most clients who want to disinherit a child have heard popular stories about the importance of leaving a dollar or some token bequest to
each child. The efficacy given to such clauses varies among the jurisdictions. 45 In those jurisdictions where such clauses aren't effective, they may

have a substantial negative effect if they sufficiently incense the "forgotten" child to become a costly obstructionist. The "beneficiaries" named
in the will must be given notice, and presumably an opportunity to appear
in opposition, to the actions of the personal representative. 46 Thus, such
clauses give the token legatee standing to contest actions taken during
the probate process.
In any event the draftsman must be careful to name the children
without defaming them.47 It's better to recognize the disinheritance
without apology than to elaborate on the testator's justification. In one
case the testatrix felt compelled to explain her reason for not including
a former husband in her will. She reported in the will that he "abandoned
me, made no provision for my support, treated me with complete indifference and did not display any affection or regard for me.'"4 8 The ex-husband

enjoyed the last laugh. He sued her estate for testamentary libel and was
awarded almost half the estate.4 9 If the testator insists on leaving a written explanation for disinheriting his issue, there must be sound basis for
the beliefs he expresses. In addition to exposing the estate to attack for
libel, unfounded allegations could be evidence of an insane delusion or
otherwise create doubt as to testamentary capacity.
3. The Multi-Colored Coat Problem
Since Biblical times parents have often chosen one child over another
as the object of their bounty.50 Quite predictably parental favoritism can
lead to extreme jealousy among siblings, and the potential for a will contest may not be as obvious to the parent as it is to the attorney.
Disparate treatment of children in itself is not grounds for a will contest. The estate planner in such circumstances should beware of providing grounds for challenge based on undue influence or insane delusion.
The attorney who doesn't want to see his handiwork destroyed by the
disappointed relatives should be careful to avoid joint meetings with the
testator and his favorite son or daughter. Including the favorite child in
those conferences could lead to charges of undue influence against the
favored beneficiary. As a precaution against charges of insane delusion,
the attorney might also discuss the inequality of distribution with the
45. A bequest of $1 to any claimant "by virtue of relationship or otherwise" was insufficient to disinherit an omitted child. In Re Torregano's Estate, 5 Cal. Rptr. 137, 54 Cal. 2d
234, 352 P.2d 505 (1960). However, a gift of $5 to any person who established that he was
an heir at law was held sufficient to show an unambiguous intent to omit an illegitimate
child. Bridgeford v. Estate of Chamberlain, 573 P.2d 694, 696 (Okla. 1977).
46. See Wvo. STAT. § 2-7-205(b) and (c) (1977, Rev. 1980).
47. See Hudak, The Sleeping Tort: Testamentary Libel 27 MERCER L. REV. 1147 (1976).
48. Brown v. DuFrey, I N.Y.2d 190, 134 N.E.2d 469, 471 (N.Y. 1956).
49. Id.
50. See the story of Joseph and the many colored coat which his father, Jacob, gave
him. Genesis 37.
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testator in the presence of the attesting witnesses, and have them record
in writing their impressions of the testator's state of mind and his cognizance of the favoritism.
4. The Isaac and Ishmael Problem 16
Frequently the planner is presented with the problem of children from
a prior marriage. The attorney must not only advise the client of the formidable obstacles presented by the elective share and spousal support
provisions, but must also deal with the emotional estrangement which
often occurs between a noncustodial parent and his child by a previous
union. Often the testator's current spouse has importuned him not to
include such children in the will. Occasionally the children from the second
union have been raised without knowledge of the existence of the previous marriage or child.
If the testator's desire is to cut his life's "Ishmaels" out of the estate,
the attorney must deal with the pretermitted heir problem. If the children to be disinherited are minors, the testator should be advised of the
52
problems inherent in the homestead exemption and family allowance.
The Wyoming family allowance provisions provide that the "spouse
and minor children are entitled to remain in possession of the homestead,
all wearing apparel of the family, and all household furniture of the decedent .... ,"5 This raises an issue unanswered in Wyoming: whether the
testator's minor child, not living in the testator's household, is only entitled to remain in possession of those items which were in her actual possession at the time of testator's death. The temporary possession problem
can be solved by expeditiously filing the inventory in the probate court
since possession is to last only until such time as the inventory is
returned. 1

The homestead exemption is more difficult to avoid. Wyoming apparently recognizes that the personal residence of the testator, if owned by
a tenancy by the entireties with the surviving spouse, will pass free of
any claim thereto by the minor "Ishmaels." 5' l However, under Wyoming
law it appears the minor "Ishmaels" are entitled to share in the value of7
the homestead exemption1 regardless of their possession of such assets.
Thus, they are still entitled to one-half of the value of the homestead and
exempt property set aside, such value to be drawn from the probate
assets.58

51. Father Abraham had a son, Ishmael, by his handmaiden, Hagar. When his wife
Sarah bore Isaac problems began. Apparently Sarah's pleadings that Ishmael not inherit
with Issac caused Abraham to reject his first son, as well as his mother, Hagar, and force
them into the desert with scanty provisions. The circumstances of Ishmael's abandonment
by his father are dramatized by the fact that were it not for miraculous intervention, he and
his mother appeared destined to die in the desert. Genesis 21.
52. See text discussion at II.A, II.B, and II.C.
53. WYO. STAT. § 2-7-501 (1977, Rev. 1980).
54. WYo. STAT. § 2-7-501 (1977, Rev. 1980).
55. Wambeke, 372 P.2d at 474.
56. WYo. STAT. § 2-7-504 (1977 & Cum. Supp. 1988).
57. Wambeke, 372 P.2d 470.
58. WYO. STAT. § 2-7-504 (1977 & Cum. Supp. 1988).
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If the "Ishmaels" are to be forever cast out of his estate plan their
statutory rights may be avoided with the creation of a trust by the testator. Alternatively, he might consider joint ownership with his present
spouse of his personal residence and minimization of whatever other assets
are subject to probate. If the client cannot retitle his assets in a manner
that avoids probate 9 he may consider leaving sufficient liquid funds to
satisfy whatever claims could be made by his minor "Ishmaels."
5. Dead-Hand Control
Whenever a client confides that he must impose restrictions on a gift
to an heir, the attorney should remind himself that if the client has been
unable to control his child's or grandchild's behavior while he's alive, there
is little likelihood that the conditional gift will curb the heir's rebelliousness once the testator is gone.
If the client is intent on using dead-hand control in his estate plan,
the attorney should make sure that the proposed restraints do not violate public policy.66 Perhaps the most typical of such gifts are those which
impose restraints on marriage or religion.61 Economic considerations seldom rule over matters of conscience or heart. Therefore, the client must
consider not only the efficacy of the proposed restraint from a legal standpoint but also whether it is likely to achieve its desired result.
6. The Ugly Trustee Problem - Choice of Fiduciary
The selection of a personal representative or trustee is a fundamental
step in the estate planning process. Yet, too often it is made simply on
the basis of the client's uninformed predilection and made62 long before the
actual details of the estate plan have been formulated.
The attorney's counsel on choice of a fiduciary is essential to proper
selection and design of the trustee arrangement. The discussion should
be broader than a simple recitation of fees charged and the type of
fiduciaries to choose from. The selection should be made with the client's
proposed estate plan in mind. The advice on appropriateness of a particular type of fiduciary must take into consideration many factors, including:
1. The tax consequences of the trusteeship.
2. The duration of the trust.
59. Certain assets, such as stock in a professional corporation or a bank director's qualifying shares, cannot be owned jointly due to statutory or regulatory restrictions. Wyo. STAT.
§ 17-3-101 (1977, Rev. 1987).
60. See Girard Trust Co. v. Schmitz, 129 N.J. Eq. 444, 20 A.2d 21, 27 (1941), where
the court refused to give effect to a restriction on a gift which prohibited the beneficiaries
from communicating with a sibling the testator disliked intensely.
61. See Nevins, Testamentary Conditions:The Principleof Uncertaintyand Religion,
18 ST. Louis U.L.J. 563 (1974); Browder, Conditions andLimitations in Restraintof Marriage, 39 MIcH. L. REV. 1288 (1941).
62. It is the author's experience that most Wyoming testators know little, if anything,
about the realities of estate and trust administration. Often their views are colored by a "horror" story they heard at some dinner party about an estate plan that went awry because
of poor trustee selection. No matter how hard they try to improve their public image, corporate trustees, like Americans abroad, are too often stereotyped as "arrogant" and "insensitive" to the needs of those around them.
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3. The need for impartiality.
4. The administrative complexity of the proposed arrangement
in terms of the document and the assets to be administered.
5. The advantages and availability of professional investment
expertise.
6. The advantages or disadvantages of family input into management decisions.
7. Succession.
8. Geographic location of the assets, beneficiaries and proposed
fiduciaries.
9. State law considerations on domicile of personal representatives.
The attorney may propose a trustee arrangement where decisionmaking is shared between a family member and a professional trustee. 3
Such arrangements may be part of an effort to design a checks and
balances approach to control over trust assets so that an independent
trustee doesn't run through the family like a rogue elephant. The trustee's
role can range from approving the sale of assets, to serving as a communicator with the other beneficiaries. The trustee may serve as mentor to
the family trustee/beneficiary until that person has gained sufficient
investment, tax, and accounting expertise to justify either taking total
control of the trust or receiving the assets free of trust.
The attorney must also discuss the potential reaction of the trust or
estate beneficiaries to the choice of a fiduciary. That choice may be a significant factor in avoiding a will contest, particularly where the proposed
personal representative is the unexpected primary object of the testator's
bounty or where the office will confer substantial authority over a key
business asset." In the case of a trust, the long-term role which the trustee
will play in the lives of the beneficiaries means that careful selection of
trustees may not only avoid a contest of the instrument, but also disputes
years after the client's death over the trustee's actions or accountings.
7. The Overly Endowed Charity, Confidant or Caretaker
Bequests to nonfamily beneficiaries such as caretakers and charities
have a tremendous propensity for inciting will contests. In such a setting
the attorney should be careful to utilize the defensive mechanisms discussed in greater detail below."6 Particular care should be given to drafting charitable bequests and trusts to satisfy tax law requirements,
63. See ESPERTI

AND PETERSON,

THE HANDBOOK OF ESTATE PLANNING 105 (2d ed. 1988)

for an excellent discussion of the relative merits of various combinations of family member(s), corporate trustee(s), and professional trustee(s).
64. See In re Estate of Getty, 85 Cal. App. 3d 755, 149 Cal. Rptr. 656 (1978) where
the issue involved the standing of the testator's granddaughter to contest a codicil that eliminated her as a potential trustee of a $700,000,000 trust, the income from which was to go
to the richest art museum in the world. The trusteeship was important, not only because
of the potential fees to be earned as a trustee, but also because of the control a trustee would

have over a major oil company.

65. See text discussion at III.E, III.F, III.G, and III.H.
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correctly identify 67
beneficiaries, 6 and avoid challenges due to ambiguities
or indefiniteness.
Where the testator intends to reward a longtime caretaker, or confidant, it would be helpful to have the testator express, not just to the
attorney and witnesses, but in the document itself, the motivation for the
gift to the outsider.
B. Choice of Instrument
In many situations the choice of instrument plays an enormous role
in successfully avoiding a subsequent contest. The attorney must skillfully guide the client's selection of the proper instrument and, in some
cases, may be able to suggest a choice of law that may prove advantageous in making the estate plan more impregnable.
Inter vivos trusts are increasingly popular with the public, in comparison with wills, because they avoid many of the publicized disadvantages 68of the probate process. However, they are still often overlooked
as a possible means of avoiding the elective share, homestead rights and
exempt property set asides, and family allowances. Contests may be
avoided because inter vivos trusts are not subject to court supervision
in Wyoming. There is no requirement for notifying heirs of the death of
the trustor or of the commencement of post-mortem trust administration.
Where the heirs are neither included in the trust nor located in the trustor's
hometown, they may not hear of the trustor's death until the passage of
time ' has barred a contest of the trust. In addition, a trust does not leave
a broad trail in the public record and therefore may be more difficult to
contest.
In some cases the client may be well advised to select a will. For example, the statute of limitations in probate which penalizes creditors who
fail to file creditor claims or file tardy claims is an important consideration, particularly for those clients with professional practices whose estates
66. The identification of the charitable beneficiary is critical. In one lawsuit the author
is familiar with a California testator left a seven figure sum for the use of Boy Scouts in
Teton County, Wyoming. Unfortunately, either the testator or draftsman incorrectly designated the Boy Scout Council that the bequest was to go to. It was left to a council which
had no jurisdiction under its charter to supervise or assist scouting in Teton County, Wyoming.
Litigation ensued as the local scouting organization challenged its out-of-state council for

control of the funds.
67. In Branson v. Roelofsz, 52 Wyo. 101, 106, 70 P.2d 589, 591 1937) the testatrix
left her estate to an undefined "foundation" to be created for the benefit of the blind. Her
plan failed because the jury found she lacked testamentary capacity and suffered from an
insane delusion.
68. Wyoming recently allowed the personal representative of an estate to negotiate a
fee with the attorney which is lower than the statutory fee. See WYo. STAT. § 2-7-804(d) (1977
& Cum. Supp. 1988). This removes perhaps the most criticized aspect of the probate process,
that is, the disparity which often existed between the statutory fee and the amount of labor
expended by the attorney.

69. The statute of limitations may bar their action. The constitutionality of trust
administration without notice to intestate heirs who are not beneficiaries may be different
than that of a probate proceeding where "state action" is involved. See the discussion of
due process requirements at IVA.1.
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may be subject to malpractice claims that have yet to ripen at the time
of the testator's death. The choice of instrument in this case won't alone
suffice to cut off known or reasonably ascertainable creditors. 0 The attorney probating the professional testator's will should consider the advisability of sending actual notice to all of the decedent's patients or clients.
Likewise the testator who is faced with considerable debts may want
to take advantage of the statutory priority for debts of the insolvent decedent.7' For example, where the decedent owes substantial taxes, the surviving spouse and minor children may receive a family allowance in
preference to the Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.).72 This is preferable
to utilizing a trust, which may be subject to the claims of the I.R.S. on
the basis of transferee liability.
Additional tax considerations may dictate that a will be used rather
than a trust. For example, only certain types of trusts may qualify as S
corporation shareholders." A grantor trust, once it ceases to be treated
as a grantor trust for income tax purposes because of the death of the
grantor, is allowed to remain as a S corporation shareholder for two years
after the grantor's death.7" In contrast a probate estate can continue to
hold S corporation stock without disqualifying the S corporation's election for as long75as the probate estate has to be kept open for administrative purposes.
C. Joint and Mutual Wills
A couple may execute joint, reciprocal, or mutual wills. A joint will
is a single instrument containing the wills of two or more individuals,
which is jointly executed by them. A reciprocal will is one in which two
or more testators make a testamentary gift in favor of each other. Mutual
wills are two or more separate wills, each executed by an individual testator, and each manifesting a common plan or intent. Wyoming has not folwills be executed as
lowed those jurisdictions which require that mutual
76
part of an agreement between the testators.
Joint, reciprocal, and mutual wills often raise the issue of whether the
surviving testator is contractually barred from revoking the provisions
of the earlier will. The fact that joint or mutual wills are executed at the
70. The United States Supreme Court recently ruled that notice by publication in a
local newspaper is not constitutionally sufficient, for due process purposes, to bar the claims
of creditors who were either known or reasonably ascertainable but did not receive actual
notice. Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, 108 S. Ct. 1340, 1347 (1988).
71. WYo. STAT. § 2-7-701 (1977 & Cum. Supp. 1988).
72. WYO. STAT. § 2-7-701(iv) and (v) (1977 & Cum. Supp. 1988).
73. See I.R.C. §§ 1361(c)(2)(A) and 1361(d)(3)(A) (P-H, Fed. Taxes 1989). Formerly, no
trust was a permissible shareholder of a Subchapter S Corporation.
74. I.R.C. § 1361(c)(2)(A)(ii) (P-H, Fed. Taxes 1989).
75. There is no specific time period imposed on an estate's ownership of S Corporation
stock by the Internal Revenue Code but the attorney must remember that an estate cannot
be kept open forever. See Old Virginia Brick Co. v. C.I.R., 367 F.2d 276, 279 (4th Cir. 1966).
76. See Shook v. Bell, 599 P.2d 1320, 1324 (Wyo. 1979) and 1 BOWE-PARKER, PAGE ON
WILLS, §§ 11.1 and 11.3 (1960).
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same time and as a result of a common plan does not raise the presumption or inference that there was a contract between the testators binding
them to the will provisions. 7 If the contract is recited in the will itself,
such as a statement that the testators "agree that this, our last will and
testament, cannot be changed or varied by either of us without the consent in writing
of the other," this is prima facie proof of the existence of
78
the contract.
Contracts between husband and wife to make mutual and reciprocal
wills are favored in Wyoming. 9 It will be much more difficult to prove
such a contract between unmarried individuals. 0 In proving such a contract greater evidentiary weight will be given to a joint will than to a
mutual will.8 However, the difficulties of proving an oral contract not to
revoke a will are substantial.
The party seeking to establish the existence of an oral contract has
a heavy burden. 2 The evidence of an oral contract to make a will must
be clear and convincing."3 The evidence must further establish that the
minds of the joint or mutual testators met on definite terms. Thus, if there
77. See Matter of Estate of Bell, 726 P.2d 71, 75 (Wyo. 1986). In this case a childless
couple executed mutual and reciprocal wills which did not recite that they were made pursuant to a contract. There were allegations that there was an oral contract but the evidence
did not support those contentions. The widow executed five codicils after her husband's death
and the final codicil made significant changes in the estate plan in favor of certain ranch
employees, reducing the share which the original beneficiaries were to receive.
78. See Flohr v. Walker, 520 P.2d 833, 834 (Wyo. 1974) (court imposes constructive
trust upon property of surviving spouse, subject to joint will).
79. In Shook, 599 P.2d at 1324, a husband and wife executed mutual and reciprocal
wills leaving all of their property to each other, but if their spouse did not survive then onehalf of the property went to the husband's niece and the other half to the wife's niece. The
husband died first and most of the property passed to the wife by operation of law. She subsequently changed her will, excluding the husband's niece. The wills did not recite a contract but evidence was introduced supporting an oral contract. The trial court found there
was no contract but the Wyoming Supreme Court reversed with directions to the lower court
to determine from all the evidence whether there was a contract and, if so, what the parties'
intent was with respect to the property which would be subject to that agreement.
80. Canada v. Ihmsen, 33 Wyo. 439, 456, 240 P. 927, 932 (1925) (neighbors execute
mutual wills leaving each other their property).
81. Shook, 599 P.2d at 1324. The theory is that a joint will could not be executed unless
there had been some prior contractual understanding or arrangement between the parties.
82. In Pangarova v. Nichols, 419 P.2d 688, 694 (Wyo. 1966), the decedent was a Bulgarian immigrant who had amassed a considerable fortune prior to his death. He and his
wife were childless and they had corresponded with his niece and her father about the possibility of bringing the niece to America and adopting her. Because she was living behind the
Iron Curtain it was very difficult to secure a visa for her. After the aunt contracted a terminal illness the uncle wrote that if the niece would come they would adopt her and she would
be their heir. Shortly thereafter the aunt passed away and the decedent wrote that he was
going to make a new will and name the niece as his beneficiary, which he did shortly thereafter. He also subsequently wrote her that he was besieged with women who were after his
property but that the niece would find, when she got to Casper, that he was all alone and
asked that she not marry. He subsequently married a woman half his age and when the niece
arrived she moved in with them but was forced to leave a month later to keep peace between
the uncle and his new wife. Shortly thereafter he made a new will leaving everything to his
second wife. The court found that the letters, along with other circumstantial evidence of
the uncle's intent, satisfied the burden of proving the oral contract to make a will by clear
and convincing evidence.
83. Id. at 695.
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is only evidence of a common plan but no evidence that the testators ever
said "we will not change our wills" the required meeting of the minds has
not occurred.8 4 If that evidence is oral conversations of the testators, those
conversations must have occurred prior to the execution of the wills, and
of complithe wills must embody the oral agreement or the requirements
85
ance with the statute of frauds will not be met.
Once a meeting of the minds has been established, the court must examine whether the contract is enforceable. That analysis is twofold: 1) was
there valid consideration for the agreement, 2) has it been timely revoked?
The mere making of the contract and the execution of the wills are not
sufficient.86 Passing jointly owned property by operation of law isn't valid
consideration to support such a contract, although such property can be
the subject of the contract.8" It is clear that the joint or mutual will may
be revoked during the life of both testators provided there is notice to
the other. 88 At the death of the first party, the survivor will be contractually bound if he or she accepts substantial benefits under the first party's
will.8 9 Presumably, a disclaimer by the survivor before accepting any
benefits would be sufficient to revoke the contract.
If the contract is enforceable, then a will revoked by the survivor after
the first party's death stands as evidence of the contract, although it cannot be admitted to probate. If the existence of the contract is proven, its
terms will have to be fulfilled even though they are at odds with the subsequently executed will of the survivor.
In In re Stringer's Estate,90 the issue of enforcement of an oral contract to make a will was raised in a contest of a subsequent will. The party
seeking to uphold the mutual will, which had been revoked by a subsequent will that both parties admitted was valid, attempted to have the
revoked mutual will admitted to probate in spite of its revocation. The
Wyoming Supreme Court ordered the last will of the survivor admitted
to probate, but instructed the probate court to see that the terms of the
contract, as evidenced in the revoked mutual will, were fulfilled.
Filing a creditor's claim offers a more expeditious approach to enforcing the terms of the contract than contesting a later will, unless there are
84. Estate of Bel, 726 P.2d at 76.
85. In Shook, 599 P.2d at 1325, the son of one of the parties testified as to the statements of the parties prior to execution of their mutual wills, which were consistent with the
provisions of their wills; but see Canada, 33 Wyo. at 448, 240 P. at 929, where the wills were
silent on what conditions were attached to the alleged oral agreement.
86. Canada, 33 Wyo. at 448, 240 P. at 929.
87. In Shook, 599 P.2d at 1322, 1326, all of the property which passed from the husband to the wife was jointly held except for $263 in cash that passed under the will Nevertheless the court noted that the oral agreement could pertain to the property owned as tenants
by the entireties.
88. The notice requirement can be satisfied if the survivor receives notice at the first
party's death and has an opportunity to revoke the will they had made in reliance on the
agreement. See the discussion on that point in Canada, 33 Wyo. at 456, 240 P. 932.
89. In Re Stringer's Estate, 80 Wyo. 389, 406, 343 P.2d 508, 514 (1958), reh. denied
80 Wyo. 426, 434, 345 P.2d 786, 784 (1959).
90. Id at 404, 343 P.2d at 513.
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independent reasons for contesting the will, such as not wanting the survivor's estate administered by the individual named in the revoking will.
If the creditor's claim is rejected then the party seeking to enforce the
terms of the contract will have to bring an action in contract against the
personal representative of the surviving testator's estate. In Wyoming,
there has been a longstanding controversy over what jurisdiction the prothe probate
bate court has.' However, recent amendments make it clear
92
court now has jurisdiction to consider the contract claim.
In some cases the beneficiaries of the contract to make a will may
anticipate a breach of the contract by the surviving testator, and if the
assets which were the subject of the contract are readily alienable, they
may not wish to wait for the death of the survivor to enforce the contract
terms. An appropriate remedy in this instance is the constructive trust. 3
The constructive trust could be impressed upon property which was owned
as an estate by the entireties or a joint tenancy with rights of survivorship, if it appears that it was the parties' intent to make that jointly owned
property subject to the terms of the contract.9 4 Although the agreement
itself could provide otherwise, Wyoming recognizes that the surviving
testator may use the income and "reasonable" portions of the principal
for his support and ordinary expenditures.9 The constructive trust would
prevent the survivor from dissipating the estate or transferring the
property with the intent of defeating the contract.
In counseling a couple which is considering the possibility of a joint
will, the attorney needs to be mindful of the conflict of interest which is
inherent in this situation.9 6 The attorney is really representing multiple
clients and should provide full disclosure to each of the effect of dual
representation on the exercise of his independent professional judgment
on behalf of each client.
The attorney should advise the couple that joint or mutual wills often
invite litigation, and explore other alternatives, such as trusts, which have
the advantage of "curing" during their lifetimes. If a couple decides to
enter into a contract to make joint or mutual wills, the instrument should
contain a statement of intent with regard to the scope of the property
covered and the encroachment the survivor may make on these assets to
maintain a standard of living. A testamentary trust might be used to
assure compliance with the terms of the agreement.
D. No-Contest Clauses - Putting Up the Shields
A no-contest clause, often referred to as an "in terrorem" clause, is
a clause which conditions a legacy upon the recipient refraining from contesting the validity of the will or its terms. The penalty for violating the
91. Church v. Quiner, 31 Wyo. 226-27, 224 P. 1073, 1074 (1924).

92.
93.
94.
95.

WYo. STAT. § 2-2-101 (1977 & Cure. Supp. 1988).
Hawkey v. Williams, 72 Wyo. 20, 62, 261 P.2d 48, 67 (1953).
Flohr, 520 P.2d 833, 837 (Wyo. 1974).
Id. at 838.

96. See generally Brosterhouse, Conflicts of Interest in Estate Planningand Administration, 123 TRUSTS AND ESTATES (June 1984).
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condition is forfeiture of the contestee's benefits under the will. 7 The purpose of a no-contest clause is to insulate the administration of the decedent's estate from costly and time-consuming litigation. If a decedent's
heirs or the beneficiaries of a revoked will receive a material benefit under
the will, a no-contest clause minimizes the threat that a disappointed heir
will challenge the will. If the contestee receives no benefit under the instrument being revoked, the no-contest clause is a hollow gesture.
1. Statutory and Judicial Exceptions
Many states have taken the chill out of in terrorem clauses. For example, Indiana provides that conditions requiring forfeiture of testamentary
gifts if a beneficiary contests the will are void. 9 Those states which have
adopted the U.P.C. sanction a "probable cause" exception to the forfeiture provisions of no-contest clauses.9 0 Other courts have refused to
enforce a no-contest clause unless it is coupled with a "gift over. ' 101
2. The Wyoming Approach - Thy Will Be Done
In 1983, Wyoming adopted the strict construction approach to nocontest clauses in Dainton v. Watson. 0 2 The contestant argued that
enforcement of the clause depriving her of the gift made for her in the
decedent's will was against public policy if the contest was made in good
faith and with probable cause to question the will's validity. The court
acknowledged that the U.P.C. had adopted a provision barring enforce-3
ment of no-contest clauses if "probable cause" existed for the contest.'
However, it noted that the legislature had chosen not to incorporate that
provision of the U.P.C. into our laws. It further noted that to judicially
carve out an exception for good faith will contests would ignore the overriding and longstanding"" policy of the court that the testator's clearly
97. An example of such a clause is: "I hereby direct that if any person entitled to any
legacy, bequest, interest or estate shall directly contest or dispute the probate of this Will,
or institute or become a party to instituting any proceedings, or act in the interest of any
person who shall institute any proceedings, suit or action for the purpose of changing the
effect of this Will wholly or in part, then and in that event all the legacies, bequests, estate
or remainder interest declared in favor of such person by this Will or herein provided, shall
immediately thereupon be revoked, cease and determine and become wholly void and of no
effect." Dainton v. Watson, 658 P.2d 79, 80 (Wyo. 1983).
98. See Leavitt, Scope and Effectiveness of No-Contest Clauses in Last Wills and Testaments, 15 HASTINCs L.J. 45, 53 (1963).
99. IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-6-2 (Burns 1972). However, a clause providing for a reversion to the decedent's estate of a legatee's gift if the beneficiary is "dissatisfied" has been
enforced in Indiana. See Doyle v. Paul, 86 N.E.2d 98, 101, reh. denied, 87 N.E.2d 885 (Ind.
1949).
100. The Restatement of Property limits the probable cause exception to contests based
on fraud or revocation by a later instrument. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF PROPERTY, § 9.1 (1983).
101. In re Arrowsmith, 147 N.Y.Supp. 1016 (1914), affd 108 N.E. 1089 (N.Y. 1915); Sherwood v. McLaurin, 88 S.E. 363 (S.C. 1916).
102. Dainton, 658 P.2d 79.
103. U.P.C. § 3-905 (1983).
104. See In re Gilchrist's Estate, 50 Wyo. 153, 180, 60 P.2d 364 (1936), where the University of Wyoming was asking the court to rule that a bequest of $100 to any of "my living
blood relations" should be construed to be a per stirpes gift, rather than per capita. The
court held it is "the intention of the testatrix, as expressed in the will" that must govern.
For a more recent reaffirmation of the policy of letting the testator's unambiguous words
control the disposition of his property see Kortz v. American National Bank of Cheyenne,
571 P.2d 985, 987 (1977).
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expressed intent must govern. The court examined the no-contest clause
and found nothing in it to exempt those who challenged the will in good
faith or probable cause from the clearly expressed forfeiture language.1°5
3. Drafting Suggestions
Since Wyoming has given strict enforcement to a clearly expressed
no-contest clause, this defensive tactic should be a vital part of the estate
planner's arsenal. The draftsman's first consideration should be whether
the testator wants to soften the impact of such a clause by excepting from
its effect proceedings to ascertain the testator's intent. In Dainton v. Watson, 01 6 Justice Rose in a concurring opinion advocated that such clauses
not be enforced against beneficiaries who are seeking to clarify the testator's intent as opposed to defeating it. Second, if the testator wants to
penalize only the contestant, the clause should be drafted so that the contestant's issue would take as if the bequest had lapsed. Many testators
feel that such "soft-pedaling" accomplishes little, and they want to cut
off the contestant's issue and anyone who assists the contestant in any
way. A third consideration is how much to provide to the beneficiary in
the first place. This will depend on what he might gain by contesting.
Fourth, if the instrument creates a testamentary trust, or if there are inter
vivos trusts in existence which the testator controls, it is advisable to
include a no-contest clause within these trusts which is tied back to actions
taken to contest the will. Also, a contestant may challenge a subsequent
codicil to the will. The draftsman can avoid any ambiguity on the effect
of the no-contest clause by providing that it applies to a contest of a subsequently adopted codicil as well as to the original will. 1°7 Fifth, the testator
must consider whether the no-contest clause provides that a contestant
loses any fiduciary appointments which the will or trust provided for.
Finally, to guard against the possibility that the court will rule that the
forfeiture provision is inoperative, the testator may wish to provide that
in such event the contestant's share of the testator's estate will bear all
of the costs incurred in defending against the contest.
The draftsman should bear in mind that unduly restrictive clauses
may invoke the jury's sympathy for the contestant. The trial attorney
may attempt to use the no-contest clause to build his case for the client's
lack of testamentary capacity or susceptibility to undue influence. The
attorney has to be prepared for the inevitable question from the contestant's counsel: why did you feel it advisable to include this clause in testator's will? If the attorney uses these clauses routinely, with younger
testators as well as the elderly, that argument is defused.
No-contest clauses should not be included in the will or trust without
discussing their effect with the client. It would also be helpful to have
in the attorney's file a letter to the client explaining the instrument and
the particular consequences of the no-contest clause.
105. Dainton, 658 P.2d at 81.
106. Id at 82.
107. See Leavitt, supra note 98, at 45-46, for a comprehensive clause that defines a will
to "include any codicil hereto."
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E. Choosing Attesting Witnesses
If one or more of the warning flags of a contest are present, the selection of witnesses can be an important defensive maneuver. A good attesting lay witness has known the testator for many years, will be able to
perform under the pressure of cross-examination in the courtroom, and
has a good chance of surviving the testator. If there is concern about
whether the witness will survive the testator it is worthwhile to include
specific statements in the self-proving affidavits that will preserve the
witness' observations of the testator's state of mind.
The attorney should, particularly if the client's affairs are being handled by a conservatorship, consider using a doctor, psychologist or psychiatrist as a witness. They might be present at the execution to conduct
a preexecution evaluation without having them actually appear as an
attesting witness. The fact that the testator was examined will be discoverable but if they aren't named as a witness the contestant's counsel
will have to work harder to discover that examination. If the testator
passes the evaluation with flying colors the attorney may want to have
the expert act as an attesting witness as this may defuse the prospect
of a contest. The courts in Wyoming seem to be giving increasing weight
to medical testimony."'9 By having an expert witness present at the time
of execution the attorney gains an additional advantage because the contestant's expert will probably concede on cross-examination that the opinion of one who has had an opportunity to observe the testator at the time
of execution is more reliable than the testimony of one who is responding
to mere hypothethical questions without the benefit of having seen the
testator first hand.
It is clear in Wyoming that the attorney who is later selected by the
personal representative as the attorney for the estate is a "disinterested"
09
witness."
In one Wyoming case an attorney who served as an attesting
witness had no specific recall of the conversation with the testator but
he was able to testify, apparently convincingly, that he would not have
witnessed the will without satisfying himself that it expressed the testa0
tor's intent."1
The same effect could be obtained if the attorney/draftsman
supervised the will execution ceremony and preserved a checklist indicating the steps which he took to make sure the will was properly executed.
F. Will Execution Ceremony
The will execution ceremony serves two functions. First, it fulfills a
psychological need the client is seeking to fulfill. One commentator has
noted:
When a client comes in to do something about his estate planning
problem, he wants a lot of things. He wants solace because he is
thinking about the day when he will not be here. He wants
108. See text discussion at V.D.
109. See In Re Lane's Estate, 50 Wyo. 119, 140, 58 P.2d 415, 421 (1936).

110. Matter of Estate of Roosa, 753 P.2d 1028, 1032 (Wyo. 1988).
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approval of what he has done and what he proposes to do. And
he wants something else he almost never gets-a ceremony. Now
life offers very few opportunities for high ceremony. Birth is not
a very good time. It is too laborious. Marriage is handled in rather
spectacular style. Nobody has been able to do much with divorce
on the ceremonial side. For death, there is a ceremony, but it is
hard for a decedent to be there to enjoy it. He is the principal."
While the ceremonial aspect may be important in fulfilling the client's
unexpressed expectations, if conducted properly the will execution
ceremony can also serve as evidence of the proper execution of the will.
It is vital that the attorney follow a checklist. A proper will execution
checklist will enhance the probabilities that the execution ceremony will
satisfy the requirements of most, if not all, states."'
G. Videotaping
Videotapes have become increasingly common in the courtroom. Ohio
was the first state to experiment with videotaped trials.' A breakthrough
in the probate potential of videotape occurred in 1985 when Indiana
adopted legislation authorizing the admission of a videotaped will execution ceremony to show that the statutory requirements for execution were
satisfied." 4 Wyoming has no such specific enabling legislation. However,
it has been suggested that a videotaped will execution ceremony might
be admissible under one or more of the exceptions to the hearsay rules." 5
1. Possible Uses
Videotaped will execution ceremonies could be used for many purposes
in addition to showing compliance with statutory execution requirements.
The videotape could also demonstrate the testator's state of mind at the
time the will was executed. It could, subject to overcoming the hearsay
objection, be another means of proving the contents of the will. 116 On the
videotape the testator could, in his own words, declare that the provisions
of the will were his own desires. This would help defeat any presumptions
of undue influence which might have been raised by a contestant. The possible uses for videotape in will contest actions and during the probate
process are only limited by the attorney's imagination and the rules of
evidence.
111. Estate Planning for Human Beings, 3 INST. EST. PLANNING 1902 (1969) (statement
of Dean Willard H. Pedrick, panelist).
112. For a procedure that the commentator suggests will satisfy the requirements of
all states other than Louisiana see Beyer, The Will Execution Ceremony-History, Sig-

nificance and Strategies, 29 So. TEx. L. REv. 413, 427-44 (1988).
113. See McCrystal & Young, Pre-Recorded Videotape Trials-An Ohio Innovation, 39
BROOKLYN L.

REV. 560 (1973).

114. IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-5-3(d) (Burns 1972 & Cum. Supp. 1988). As early as 1956,
audio recordings of a testator's statements at the time of the execution of his will were ruled
admissible on the issues of testamentary capacity and undue influence once a proper foundation had been laid. See Belfield v. Coop, 134 N.E.2d 249, 255 (Ill. 1956).
115. Beyer, Videotaping the Will Execution Ceremony-PreventingFrustrationof the
Testator's Final Wishes, 15 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 14-15 (1983.
116. Wyo. R. EvID. 804(b)(5) and 803(3) offer two avenues to argue that the videotape
is admissible.
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2. The Production: Action - Lights - Camera
Care must be taken that the will execution ceremony isn't turned into
an amateurish will execution production. The videotaping will be more
effective if it doesn't appear to be staged. Yet, the testator generally won't
be comfortable in front of the video operator and may require frequent
prompting. If the attorney encourages the client to speak in his own words,
prompts the client by asking questions that will lead the client into
narrative responses, and tries to have the camera and lights situated to
avoid having the testator speaking from a shadowy background, then
the ceremony will be effectively preserved. 17 The attorney will have to
decide whether to utilize a professional video operator or to attempt to
make it an in-house production."8 In either event, the attorney should keep
in mind
that the purpose of the video is for demonstration in the court19
room.1
H. Preserving the Document
The U.P.C. only requires that the contents of a lost will be proved
by a preponderance of the evidence. Wyoming requires that the provisions
of the will be "clearly and distinctly proven by at least two credible witnesses."' 2 0 Furthermore, Wyoming requires that a lost or destroyed will
must be. proved to have been in existence at the time of the testator's
death or else to have been fraudulently destroyed during his lifetime."'
This places heavy emphasis on the need for safeguarding the client's will.
Many attorneys have experienced first hand the frustration of not
being able to locate the original will after a testator's death."2 Another
fear is that the client, despite clear warnings by the attorney at the time
of the will execution ceremony about the dangers of tampering with the
document, will proceed at a later date with an artistic, but ineffective,
job of writing in changes on the original and revoking substantial portions of the will with the scratch of his pen."' For these reasons, attorneys often suggest to clients that the will be kept on deposit at the
attorney's office for safekeeping. One court has held that the will should
only be kept by the attorney upon the specific unsolicited request of the
client. 124
117. See Beyer, supra note 115 at 27-32, for an excellent discussion of the preparation
that is essential to have the videotaping pass muster, from an evidentiary standpoint.

118. For the pros and cons on professional videotaping versus in-house productions, see
Buckley, Indiana'sNew Videotaped Wills Statute: Launching Probate Into the 21st Century, 20 VAL. U. L. REV. 83, 90-92 (1985).
119. See Beyer, supra note 115, at 37-43 for a twenty-five step process for successfully
conducting the will execution production on video.
120. WYo. STAT. § 2-6-207(b) (1977, Rev. 1980).
121. WYo. STAT. § 2-6-207(b) (1977, Rev. 1980).
122. See DUKEMINIER AND JOHANSON, supra note 42 at 326 n.45, for a hilarious example
of the problems which can occur when the client and attorney have failed to communicate
on the location of the original will.
123. See MatterofEstate of Dobson, 708 P.2d 422 (Wyo. 1985), for a classic illustration
of this danger as it affects a holographic will.
124. State v. Gulbankian, 196 N.W.2d 733, 736 (Wis. 1972).
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IV.

ATTACKING THE WILL OR WILL SUBSTITUTE

"He's Gone, Ohnn and Nothin' Gonna Bring Him Back"
The Grateful Dead
Testamentary dispositions are a creature of statute.' 5 In controlling
the right of testation the legislature has imposed certain formalities that
must be carefully observed in executing the will unless it is a holographic
will.'2 6 Exempting a holographic will from the formalities of execution is
requirement that it be "entirely" in the testajustified by the evidentiary
27
tor's handwriting.'
Once proof is made to the probate court of the proper execution and
attestation of the will, a presumption arises that the testator was of sound
2
The effect of this presumption is to shift the burden of proof to
mind.'1
the contestant who wants to deny the admission of the will to probate.
This bias in favor of admitting a duly executed will to probate was best
summed up in these words from the first reported Wyoming decision
involving a will contest: Wills deliberately made by persons with testamentary capacity will not be lightly set aside." '
A. ProceduralAspects
Just as there was no right to make a will under the common law, there
was no right to disprove or contest a will.'3" The contestant has only those
rights as the law gives him and the courts insist that the procedures set
up for contesting a will be followed strictly or even a timely brought contest proceeding will be denied, no matter how meritorious it may be.
1. Statute of Limitations
Wyoming formerly provided for different procedures to contest a will
before' 3' and after'"' it had been admitted to probate. Now a will contest
can only be brought after the will has been admitted to probate."'
However, it appears' 3 that the contestant could appear and attempt to
defeat the proponent's efforts to "prove" the will if he could find out when
the hearing on the proponent's petition for probating a will was to be
125. Matter of Estate of Reed, 672 P.2d 829, 831 (Wyo. 1983).
126. WYo. STAT. § 2-6-113 (1977, Rev. 1980) requires only that the will be entirely in
the testator's handwriting and must be signed by the testator.
127. Lorenzo v. Howard, 708 P.2d 422, 426 (Wyo. 1985). The requirement of Wyo. STAT.
§ 2-6-113 that the holographic will be entirely in the handwriting of the testator was strictly
enforced and a handwritten will was denied admission to probate because there were several
notations on the document in the handwriting of a third party. This will may have been valid
in the majority of states which recognize holographic wills and have adopted the less restrictive requirements of § 2-503 of the U.P.C. that the "signature and the material provisions are in the handwriting of the testator."
128. Estate of Roosa, 753 P.2d at 1032.
129. Cook v. Bolduc, 24 Wyo. 281, 291, 157 P. 580, 581 (1916).
130. Gaunt v. Kansas Univ. Endow. Ass'n., 379 P.2d 825, 826 (Wyo. 1963).
131. Law of 1890-91, ch. 70, art. 3, § 1 (repealed 1899).
132. Law of 1890-91, ch. 70, art. 3, § 6 (repealed 1899).
133. WYo. STAT. § 2-6-301 (1977 & Cum. Supp. 1988).
134. WYo. STAT. § 2-6-203 (1977 & Cum. Supp. 1988).
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held.'35 If the will is "self-proving"" ' no hearing is required and the will
is admitted to probate without
further proof than the statements con1 37
tained in the petition itself.
One of the public policy purposes of the Wyoming Probate Code is
to promote "a speedy and efficient system for liquidating the estate of
the decedent and making distribution to his successors."I' s" Towards that
end, a will contest in Wyoming must be brought within three months,139
which begins to run upon publication of the notice of filing the petition
0
to have a will admitted to probate, with or without administration."1 If
no will contest is filed, then at the expiration
of the three-month period
1
the will probate is deemed conclusive."
The probate arm of the district court is in fact a distinct court with
its own docket."4 Even when a will contest petition is filed within three
months, it will not be given effect if it is filed in the wrong court. 4 The
contestant must file the will contest petition in the "court in which the
will was proved."'44
2. Pleadings, Jury Demand, and Discovery
The petition must state the contestant's allegations against the validity of the will, such as undue influence, lack of testamentary capacity,
fraud, duress, or revocation. Alternatively, the pleadings may make allegations against the sufficiency of the proof of execution, such as a lack
of disinterested, competent witnesses or failure to witness in the prescribed
manner. Finally, the petition's prayer for relief should ask for revocation
of the order admitting the will to probate. " 5
135. In the author's experience unless the judge is put on notice that there may be conflicting wills, the petition to admit a will to probate is generally done in an ex-parte fashion
the same day the petition is filed.
136. WYo. STAT. § 2-6-114 (1977, Rev. 1980). A self-proving will is a will which is executed
and then made self-proving by an affidavit procedure. That affidavit may be embodied in
the will in which case it is called a one-step self-proving will. If the affidavit is a document
separate from the will, it is called a two-step self-proving will. If it is the latter, the testator
and witnesses must sign both the will and the separate affidavit for the will to be valid and
self-proving. The affidavit is made in front of a notary public and attests to the facts evidencing
proper execution, testamentary capacity, freedom from undue influence, etc.
137. WYO.STAT. § 2-6-204 (1977, Rev. 1980).
138. WYo. STAT. § 2-1-102(a)(iii) (1977, Rev. 1980).
139. WYo. STAT. § 2-6-306 (1977 & Cure. Supp. 1988).
140. These are the notices required at Wyo. STAT. §§ 2-6-122 or 2-7-201 (1977 & Cum.
Supp. 1988).
141. WYo. STAT. § 2-6-306 (1977 & Cum. Supp. 1988).
142. The probate court's jurisdiction is an exclusive jurisdiction on all matters touching the settlement and distribution of the estates for which letters have been granted. The
probate court's subject matter jurisdiction is coextensive with the jurisdiction over subject
matter of the district court in any civil action. See Wyo. STAT. § 2-2-101 (1977 & Cure. Supp.
1988).
143. Gaunt, 379 P.2d at 827. The proper court for filing matters that may be probate
related has been further defined by two recent Wyoming cases. See Matterof Estate of Harry
B. Fulmer, 761 P.2d 658 (Wyo. 1988), and V-1 Oil Company v. District Court, No. 88-168,
Slip. op. (Wyo. Jan. 12, 1989).
144. Wvo. STAT. § 2-6-301 (1977 & Cum. Supp 1988).
145. WYO.STAT. § 2-6-301 (1977 & Cum. Supp. 1988).
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While the probate court has subject matter jurisdiction, it does not
obtain jurisdiction over the parties in the will contest proceeding until
the summons has been issued. 14 6 The summons must be served on the executors and must be sent by certified mail, with a copy of the petition
attached, to all the legatees and devisees mentioned in the will and all
the heirs, so far as known to the petitioner. 147
The Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure govern the summons, service
and proceedings of will contests.148 Thus, if the contestant desires a jury
trial he must make a timely demand.14 9 Likewise, the proponent should
file an answer to the petition brought on by the contestant. While the petition isn't a complaint per se, the reference in Wyoming Statutes section
2-6-302150 that the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure shall govern the
proceedings arguably leaves the door open for the allegations in the petition to be treated as a complaint, and failure to answer would subject the
proponent to a motion for default judgment.
Because the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure apply to the proceedings, both counsel for proponent and contestant must consider the opportunities to conduct discovery. This may be particularly important in cases
involving testamentary capacity or undue influence, as it will allow the
respective parties to depose expert witnesses who will testify as to the
mental or physical condition of the testator.15 1 It also can enable counsel
who is attacking the formalities of execution to gauge the credibility of
the witnesses to the execution, and lay a foundation for impeachment if
stories of the circumstances surrounding the will's execution should
change between the deposition and the testimony at trial. Finally, discovery may assist in determining if there is a basis for settlement through
the device of a family agreement, which is recognized in Wyoming." 2 Discovery may also be aided by the fact that costs, but not attorney fees,
are awarded to the prevailing party in a will contest proceeding." 3
3. Due Process Requirements
Attempts to bring a will contest beyond the statutory period of limitations have been unsuccessful in Wyoming. However, recent developments in the concept of due process as it relates to probate proceedings
146. Merrill v. District Court of Fifth Judicial Dist., 73 Wyo. 58, 66, 272 P.2d 597, 599
(1954).
147. WYo. STAT. § 2-6-302 (1977, Rev. 1980).
148. WYo. STAT. § 2-6-302 (1977, Rev. 1980).
149. Wyo. R. Civ. P. 38.
150. WYo. STAT. § 2-6-302 (1977, Rev. 1980).
151. Estate of Dobson, 708 P.2d 422.
152. See Augustine v. Gibson, 429 P.2d 314, 316 )Wyo. 1967).
153. Matter of Estate of Croft, 734 P.2d 59, 60 (Wyo. 1987). This decision turned on
the court's interpretation of the statutory language under Wyo. STAT. § 2-6-305 that authorizes the payment of "fees and expenses" by the contestant if the will is affirmed but only
the payment of "costs" if the probate is revoked. The Wyoming Supreme Court held that
the statutory reference to "fees and expenses" wasn't clear enough to satisfy its standard
that attorney fees are only awarded if there is an express statutory or contractual obligation. See Bowers Welding and Hotshot, Inc. v. Bromley, 699 P.2d 299, 307 (Wyo. 1985) and
Graves v. Utah Power & Light Company, 713 P.2d 187, 194 n.6 (Wyo. 1986).
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call into question longstanding assumptions upon which Wyoming's probate code has been based.
The first Wyoming case to consider sufficiency of notice in probate
was Rice v. Tilton.15 In Rice, the executor named in the will did not receive
the statutory notice of probate. Under the law in effect at the time of the
Rice case, notice only had to be given to those heirs residing within the
state who were known to the petitioner. The court held the failure to serve
notice on the executor named in the will did not make the order admitting the will to probate and granting letters testamentary void."' Instead
that order was merely voidable.
In 1936, the Wyoming Supreme Court again considered sufficiency
of notice in probate in In re Lane's Estate.56 In Lane's Estate one of the
heirs did not receive the notice as required by law'57 and the heir appeared
before the court. The court found that the order admitting the will to probate could not be attacked collaterally after the time for contesting the
will had run. 5 The court in Lane's Estate suggested in rem jurisdiction
attaches once the notice prescribed by the statute is given and that the
"entire world is called before the court" and is bound by its decisions,
whether or not they choose to appear."59
The validity of the Rice and Lane's Estate decisions was called into
question by Mullane v.Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,'"1' in which
the United States Supreme Court held that due process requires notice
reasonably calculated to apprise the person whose interests will be affected
by the court's decree. After Mullane, Wyoming modified its statute to
require that in addition to publication of the notice of probate notice be
mailed to the surviving spouse and to "all of the heirs and beneficiaries
named in the will.' 16' However, the statute continued to treat the publication date of the notice of probate, rather than receipt of the notice by
the heir, as the triggering point for running the will contest limitations
period.
In Hartt v. Brimmer,16 1 the Wyoming Supreme Court applied the modified statute and held that so long as the probate court had acquired proper
jurisdiction by giving the requisite notice to the heirs, the order admitting the will to probate would stand even if an heir alleged that she was
never mailed a copy of the notice of probate.' Proper publication of the
notice of probate was made and the surviving spouse had signed a waiver
154. 14 Wyo. 101, 82 P. 577 (1905).
155. Id at 112, 82 P. at 579.
156. 50 Wyo. 119, 58 P.2d 415 (1936).
157. Id. at 138, 58 P.2d at 421. See also Wyo. STAT. § 2-6-201 (1977, Rev. 1980) which
provides that no defect in the form or the statement of jurisdictional facts in the petition
makes an order admitting a will to probate void.
158. Lane's Estate, 50 Wyo. at 139, 58 P.2d at 421.
159. Id. at 137, 58 P.2d at 420.
160. 339 U.S. 306, 320 41949).
161. WYo. STAT. § 2-7-205 (1977, Rev. 1980).
162. 74 Wyo. 356, 287 P.2d 645 (1955).
163. Id at 365, 287 P.2d at 648.
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of notice which was filed by the will's proponents in the probate court.
The court noted that the waiver of notice or personal service would be
sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over the heirs, even though the
widow contended the waiver was invalid because she had signed it while
under sedatives prescribed by her doctor on the night of her husband's
funeral. The court held that this temporary
aberration of her mental facul4
ties did not vitiate her consent.1
In Matter of Estate of Reed,85
1 the most recent Wyoming Supreme
Court decision in the probate area, the issue was whether sufficient notice
was given to the heir of a decedent to start the three months limitation
time for a will contest. Although the court could have addressed the constitutional issue of due process in interpreting the Wyoming statute requiring notice to the decedent's heirs of the commencement of probate
proceedings, 166 it never had to reach that issue because it found that the
notice sent and published did not comply with the statutory require67
ments.
Reed involved a will contest between a daughter and her stepmother
over the deceased father's estate. The stepmother filed a petition to have
the California will admitted to probate in Wyoming. Upon the commencement of the Wyoming probate a notice of probate, along with the will and
the order admitting the will to probate, was allegedly mailed to a California attorney who had some years before represented the daughter but who
was not her attorney of record in the California probate proceedings. No
notice was mailed to the daughter. Neither the published notice nor the
notice which was mailed to the daughter's former attorney contained the
proviso, embodied in the form which the legislature has provided, 16 advising potential will contestants that any action to set aside the will must
be filed within three months.
The stepmother argued that there had been "substantial compliance"
with the statute and cited Hartt v. Brimmer.' 6 1 The court easily distinguished that case, because the published notice in Hartt complied with
the statute and the widow had signed a waiver of notice which was filed
in the probate court. The court then held that the "special public policy,"
which it had previously recognized in Hartt, of prompt settlement of
estates "cannot be achieved unless the published notice
is initially
170
statutorily sufficient to trigger the three months time."'
If the published notice had contained the clear and concise language
of the statutory notice of probate, the court would have had to address
the issue of whether the mailing itself was constitutionally defective. Since
the stepmother resided in the same town in California as the daughter
164. Id at 371, 287 P.2d at 650.
165. No. 88-137, slip op. (Wyo. Jan. 31, 1989).
166. WYo. STAT. § 2-7-205(a) (1977, Rev. 1980).
167. No. 88-137, slip op. (Wyo. Jan. 31, 1989).
168. Id at 8. WYo. STAT. § 2-7-201 (1977, Rev. 1980) contains a form which the court
noted could have been easily utilized by the stepmother.
169. 74 Wyo. 356, 287 P.2d 645 (1955).
170. Estate of Reed,No. 88-137, slip op. at 10.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1989

29

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 24 [1989], Iss. 2, Art. 8
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXIV

and the daughter's mailing address was contained in the local phone book,
the case would have presented the court with a classic opportunity to
decide whether the "reasonably ascertainable" standard which the United
States Supreme Court recently adopted in a creditors claim context should
apply to heirs as well as to creditors.
In Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope,'7 ' the United
States Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a two-month
limitations period on filing creditors claims. The Oklahoma statute in question was triggered by publication of a notice of probate for two consecutive weeks. The creditor in Pope failed to file its claim within that
two-month period but subsequently filed suit against the personal
representative for payment of the fees owed its parent corporation, a hospital, under an Oklahoma statute which provided that the personal representative pay the last illness expenses of the decedent. The creditor argued
that the statute providing for payment of last illness expenses excused
Oklait from having to file a claim, an argument which was rejected by the
72
homa Supreme Court but not reached by the Supreme Court.
In an opinion by Justice O'Connor, the Supreme Court found that the
probate court's involvement in the administration of the decedent's estate
constituted "state action." The Court found that the Oklahoma statute
operating in connection with the probate court proceedings "adversely
affected" the creditor's property interest so as to require, under the due
notice be given to the known and reasonably
process clause, that actual
73
ascertainable creditors.
In Pope the Supreme Court left several issues unresolved. The application of the due process clause was grounded on its finding that the probate court proceedings constituted state action. It may be argued that
revocable trusts or estate administration which is substantially independent of the court system (such as the simplified probate procedure by
affidavit available in Wyoming under Wyoming Statute section 2-1-201,1,
or the so-called independent administration available under the U.P.C.' Ts)
do not constitute "state action" and, therefore, do not require actual notice
to creditors or heirs. It also can be expected, but isn't totally clear yet,
that an heir or other interested party in a decedent's estate must receive
actual notice of the proceeding in order to satisfy the due process requirements laid out in Pope.7 "
In light of this new definition of the due process requirement in probate, it appears likely that the limitation on contesting a will will not begin
171. 108 S. Ct. 1340 (1988).
172. Id at 1344.
173. Id at 1348.
174. WYo. STAT. § 2-1-201 (1977 & Cum. Supp. 1988).
175. U.P.C. §§ 3-1201 to 3-1204 (West 1983).
176. For a discussion of due process requirements in probate prior to Pope, see Borron,
Due Processof Law and the Sufficiency of Published Notice of Letters Granted, 7 PROBATE
L. J. 61, 71 (1985). That commentator reached the conclusion, prior to Pope,that due process
constraints would require reasonable notice to all "interested parties" by a method more
certain than notice by publication.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol24/iss2/8

30

Warnick: The Ungrateful Living: An Estate Planner's Nightmare - The Trial
1989

THE UNGRATEFUL LIVING

to run against an heir until that heir has received notice reasonably calculated to apprise him of the proceeding.77
The current Wyoming Probate Code does not require that a copy of
the will be sent to those entitled to the notice of probate. In Kortz v. American Nat.Bank of Cheyenne, the contestant, who had filed her will contest
after the three-month period had run, argued that someone had substituted
a page into the will filed with the court other than the page which was
in the will when the testator executed it. "' This defect could only be ascertained by actual examination of the will and apparently the contestant
had not seen the will filed with the probate court within the three-month
period. Nevertheless, the court held that the will which was admitted to
probate became conclusive once no one 1had
contested it within the
79
statutorily prescribed three-month period.
There is nothing in the Pope decision that would seem to call into question the Kortz decision. Pope only demands that creditors, whose property
interests will be affected by the nonclaim statute of limitations, be given
actual notice of the probate proceedings. The Court didn't require that
they receive anything more than the notice of the commencement of the
probate. Presumably once they have been notified it is up to each creditor to take whatever steps, including making an investigation of the probate court file, to protect its interests. There seems to be no policy reason
to require that the will be sent to the heirs along with the notice of probate. Once they have received notification each heir must take steps to
protect his interest and those steps would include an investigation of the
probate court's file.
B. Mistake in Execution
All attested wills must satisfy the formalities of execution set out in
the Wyoming statutes,1 80 or the requirements of a foreign jurisdiction that
meets the statutory test of contacts. 8 Wyoming requires that the attested
will be witnessed by two "competent" witnesses and be signed by the
testator, or by some person in his presence and at his express direction.
A subscribing witness who is benefitted by the attested will executed in
Wyoming will lose all but what interest would have passed to him by
intestacy unless there are at least two other disinterested and competent
witnesses.
Wyoming also requires that the attested will be in writing or typewritten.' 8 This requirement has produced some of the more interesting
Wyoming cases, including one which has attracted national attention.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
bed will,

Allan v. Allan, 236 Ga. 199, 223 S.E.2d 445, 451 (1976).
Kortz, 571 P.2d 986.
Id. at 987.
WYo. STAT. § 2-6-112 (1977, Rev. 1980).
WYo. STAT. § 2-6-116 (1977, Rev. 1980).
Wyoming has not recognized the nuncupative will, sometimes caled an oral or deathsince 1895. See In Re Thornton's Estate, 21 Wyo. 421, 435, 133 P. 134, 137 (1913).
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In EstateofReed 83 the testator spoke into a tape recorder his "truest
and strongest feelings" and then left testamentary instructions on tape.
The tape was then placed in a sealed envelope on which was handwritten
"Robert Reed To be played in the event of my death only! (signed) Robert
G. Reed."I" These instructions were transcribed after the testator's death
by the police. The "will's" proponents argued that this recorded will should
be admitted to probate as a holographic will. They cited a recent California case185 where the court admitted a preprinted stationer's form containing the testator's handwriting as a holographic will, finding that none
of the preprinted words were either material to the substance of the will
or essential or necessary to its validity. The Wyoming Supreme Court
found that a voiceprint was not equivalent to the testator's handwriting.
In denying the will's admissibility to probate they held that the decision
to extend the concept of a testamentary instrument8 6 to a tape recording
was something that only the legislature could do.1
The attested will may be imprinted on carbon paper as long as the
carbon copy contains the signature of the testator and two subscribing
witnesses.1 87 It must describe the property to be bequeathed and the
recipient. Thus, a writing on a hospital form without any description of
the property being bequeathed, other than the nominal sum of one dollar, was denied probate.'88
Wyoming does not require publication by the testator. Thus, a will
was admitted to probate where the attesting witness was not told by the
testatrix that it was her last will and testament but was merely requested
to verify her signature.8 9
Wyoming's statutes' 90 do not appear to require that the testator sign
in the presence of the witnesses, although they clearly require that if someone else signs the will for the testator it be done at his request and in
his presence. The affidavit which is intended to provide written proof of
proper execution requires that (1) the testator declared the instrument
to be his will; (2) the testator requested that the witnesses witness the
will; (3) the testator subscribed the instrument; (4) the subscription of the
witnesses be made in the presence of the testator; (5) the witness knew
the other witness; and (6) the process occurred in the presence of the other
183. 672 P.2d 829 (Wyo. 1983).
184. Id. at 833.
185. Estate of Black, 641 P.2d 754, 759 (Cal. 1982).
186. Estate of Reed, 672 P.2d at 832. See Note, Probate-TheEnforcement of Unwritten Wills, 20 LAND & WATER L. REV. 279 (1985) for a comprehensive discussion of the Estate
of Reed case and a suggestion for statutory reform to accommodate those who, for whatever
reason, desire to leave their will on recorded media. A recent article suggesting the use of
videotapes as a substitute for written wills is Nash, A Videowil" Safe andSure, 70 A.B.A.J.
87 (October 1984).
187. Stringer, 80 Wyo. at 424, 343 P.2d at 522.
188. In Re Boyd's Estate, 366 P.2d 336, 337 jWyo. 1961).
189. Estate of Carey, 504 P.2d at 800. The Wyoming Supreme Court noted that under
a statute such as Wyoming's the great weight of authority is that publication is not necessary and the witnesses do not need to know they are signing and attesting a will. Id at 801.
190. WYo. STAT. § 2-6-112 (1977, Rev. 1980).
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witness.' 9' This has apparently led Wyoming courts to impose a "presence"
requirement that the legislature may not have intended. For example, in
Matter of Estate of Altman'92 one witness' affidavit satisfied the six
requirements outlined above but his oral testimony was contradictory.
He testified that he did not sign the will in the presence of the testator.
The other subscribing witness as well as the proponent testified that they
were present, along with the witness who had contradicted his sworn
affidavit, when the testator signed, and then the two subscribing witnesses
signed in his presence. The court held that there was sufficient evidence
for the jury to conclude that the requirements for execution had been
met.9' But the troubling aspect of the opinion is that the court did not
clearly articulate whether the statutory requirements of Wyoming Statutes section 2-6-112'1 are somehow modified by the written proof requirement of Wyoming Statutes section 2-6-205.'19 The opinion might be
interpreted to require that the testator and the subscribing witnesses sign
in each other's presence. Alternatively, it could be read to mean that when
there is a contradiction between the written proof and the oral proof, the
jury must find sufficient evidence from which it can conclude that the will
was in fact signed by the testator and witnessed by two competent
witnesses. Until another decision on this point, the only safe means to
execute a will in Wyoming would be to follow the procedure contained
in section 2-6-205, and to have the testator sign the will in the witnesses'
presence.
C Undue Influence
To warrant setting aside a will on grounds of undue influence, it must
be shown that the alleged undue influence destroyed the testator's free
agency. It must result in substituting the will of another for that of the
96
testator.'
Contestants commonly combine claims of undue influence with claims
that the testator lacked capacity because there is a presumption that a
weakened mentality is more easily influenced.' 97 In many cases the same
evidence is presented to prove both claims. If the evidence shows that
testamentary capacity does not exist, the issue of undue influence need
not be considered because a will is void if the testator lacks capacity.' 9'
However, the mere fact that a testatrix is highly eccentric, filthy, forgetful, miserly, or inattentive does not compel conclusion of susceptibility
191. WYo. STAT.

§ 2-6-205

(1977, Rev. 1980).

192. 650 P.2d 277 (Wyo. 1982).
193. Id. at 280.
194. WYo. STAT. § 2-6-112 (1977, Rev. 1980).
195. WYo. STAT. § 2-6-205 (1977, Rev. 1980).
196. In re Draper's Estate, 374 P.2d 425, 432 (Wyo. 1962).
197. In re Nelson's Estate, 72 Wyo. 444, 478, 266 P.2d 238, 251 (1954).
198. In re Faragher's Estate, 367 P.2d 972, 973 (Wyo. 1962). This case was submitted
to the jury on both issues. The will was not admitted to probate because the jury found the
testator lacked testamentary capacity. Compare Matter of Estate of Waters, 629 P.2d 470,
472 (Wyo. 1981). See Wyo. STAT. § 2-6-101 for a definition of testamentary capacity.
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to undue influence, any more than the same showing requires a conclusion of lack of testamentary capacity. 199
1. Character of Evidence Showing Undue Influence
Direct evidence of undue influence is seldom found. The more skillful
the schemer the more subtle and secretive his techniques. Recognizing
the difficulties of proof, Wyoming courts have allowed undue influence
to be proven by circumstantial evidence. 00 Thus, it is only necessary to
prove facts from which undue influence may be fairly and reasonably
evidence to show that
inferred, 0 1 and then connect the circumstantial
202
undue influence was actually exercised.
Before the proponent of the contested will has any obligation to
present evidence showing that undue influence did not exist the contestant carries the heavy burden of proving the following elements: (1) the
relations between the one charged with exercising undue influence and
the decedent afforded an opportunity to control the testamentary act; (2)
the decedent was susceptible, due to mental or physical weakness, to
influence; (3) the person charged with exercising undue influence did
engage in some influencing activity; and (4) such person unduly profited
as a beneficiary under the will. 20 3 It is not sufficient to merely show that
a party benefited by a will had the motive and opportunity to exert undue
influence. There must be evidence that she exerted undue influence" 4 and
the behavior so that the will doesn't really
that the effort in fact influenced
20 1
reflect the testator's wishes.
The courts often consider the naturalness and justness of a will's provisions. Excluding the2°natural object of the testator's bounty can be a
"red flag of warning," but in Wyoming, the courts have made it clear
that the unnaturalness of the will standing alone is not dispositive, 07 particularly when there is evidence of a strained relationship between the
testator and the natural objects of his bounty.208 Most of the Wyoming
will contest cases dealing with undue influence have involved collateral
relatives rather than children. In fact, not having children makes it more
likely that the testator will become fond of one relative who becomes the
main object of his bounty.20 Also, it may be perfectly natural for the testator to favor one heir over the others when the testator's chief desire is
to perpetuate an asset, such as a ranch or business, which cannot be easily divided from an operational or economic standpoint.210 The courts have
199. Nelson's Estate, 72 Wyo. at 455-62, 266 P.2d at 241-44.
200. Estate of Waters, 629 P.2d at 473.

201. Matter of Estate of Brosius, 683 P.2d 663, 667 (Wyo. 1984).
202. Nelson's Estate, 72 Wyo. at 462, 266 P.2d at 244.
203. Id. at 479, 266 P.2d at 252.

204. See Estate of Brosius, 683 P.2d at 666, citing four previous Wyoming cases in support of this requirement.
205. Draper'sEstate, 374 P.2d at 431. See also Estate of Carey, 504 P.2d at 800.

206. In re Culver's Estate, 22 Wis.2d 665, 673, 126 N.W.2d 536, 540 (1964).
207. In re Estate of Morton, 428 P.2d 725, 733 (Wyo. 1967).
208. Estate of Brosius, 683 P.2d at 666.

209. Nelson's Estate, 72 Wyo. at 463, 266 P.2d at 244.
210. Id
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frequently said there is no legal 21duty to make an equal division of one's
property among one's relatives. '
The following circumstances can enhance the contestant's effort to
make a prima facie case of undue influence: the testator suffers from the
ravages of alcohol;2" the testator is feeble of mind and body and dies
shortly after the will is executed; 1 3 the testator is adjudged an incompetent immediately after the execution of the will; 1 4 a family history of
insanity;" 5 the draftsman is a beneficiary;218 the beneficiary holds a power
of attorney and acts as a go-between with an attorney who isn't the testator's longtime legal counsel; 21 7 the draftsman is never allowed to talk to
the testator without the beneficiary being present; 21 the beneficiary is
present and takes an active part in the execution of the will and then takes
the instrument into his possession; 1 9 evidence of a sexual relationship
between the testator and the unrelated beneficiary;' 0 and the execution
of the will, and its contents, are shrouded in secrecy. The following circumstances have been given little if any weight in the determination of
whether there was sufficient proof of undue influence: insisting that a will
be drawn;2 ' making arrangements with an attorney to set up a conference;2 22 and taking the testatrix to the attorney's office but not being
present at the execution of the will."'
24
Since no single factor is generally sufficient to prove undue influence
the contestant must open a broad field of inquiry to assert a combination
of "suspicious circumstances" sufficient to persuade the trier of fact.
2. Burden of Persuasion - Undue Influence
The general rule for the burden of proof is that it rests upon the will
contestant. 225 The so-called English rule that the burden of persuasion
always rests on the proponent of the will is clearly a minority view26and
several states which had adopted it have retreated from the rule.1
211. Id at 246; In Re Johnston's Estate, 63 Wyo. 332, 344, 181 P.2d 611, 615 (1947).
212. Estate of Waters, 629 P.2d at 473.
213. In Re Conroy's Estate, 29 Wyo. 62, 78, 211 P. 96, 100 (1922). But see In re Anderson's Estate, 71 Wyo. 238, 246, 255 P.2d 983 (1953), where the testator died eleven days
after signing the will.
214. In Re Ingram's Estate, 384 P.2d 1020, 1021 (Wyo. 1963).
215. Branson, 52 Wyo. at 115, 70 P.2d at 594.
216. Conroy's Estate,29 Wyo. at 76-77, 211 P. at 99. But see Baldwin v. Birchby, 346
P.2d 278 (Wyo. 1959).
217. Brug v. Case, 600 P.2d 710, 715 (Wyo. 1979).
218. Estate of Waters, 629 P.2d at 473.
219. Conroy's Estate, 29 Wyo. at 78, 211 P. at 100.
220. In Re Kelly's Estate, 150 Or. 598, 46 P.2d 84, 92 (1935). In Estate of Brosius, 683
P.2d at 664, while the record didn't contain evidence of a sexual relationship it did involve
a situation where a woman rented a room to an elderly gentleman. For a collection of cases
dealing with undue influence by lovers see Annotation, Existence of Illicit or Unlawful Relation
Between Testator and Beneficiary as Evidence of Undue Influence, 76 A.L.R. 3d 743 (1977).
221. Nelson's Estate, 72 Wyo. at 469, 266 P.2d at 247.
222. Estate of Carey, 504 P.2d at 800.
223. Draper's Estate, 374 P.2d at 431.
224. Estate of Waters, 629 P.2d at 473.
225. Wood v. Wood, 25 Wyo. 26, 37, 164 P. 844, 847 (1917); In Re Merrill's Estate, 80
Wyo. 276, 286, 341 P.2d 506, 509 (1959).
226. Wood, 25 Wyo. at 37, 164 P. at 847.
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The Wyoming Supreme Court has vacillated somewhat on whether
the burden of persuasion is by mere preponderance or whether "clear and
convincing" evidence is required in order to set aside a will. In an early
Wyoming case the court held that only a preponderance of the evidence
was required for each claim the contestant made. 227 Later cases introduced
the requirement that "clear proof" was required to establish undue
influence.2 28 Recent cases held that, once suspicious circumstances are
established by clear proof, 28 the contestant is "no20 longer saddled with
a 'clear proof' standard under remaining issues.
3. Presumption of Exercise of Undue Influence in Will Contests
Most of the authorities support the view that "a presumption of undue
influence arises upon a showing that one who drew the will, or was otherwise active directly in preparing it or procuring its execution, obtains
under the will a substantial benefit, to which he has no natural claim, or
a benefit which, in amount, is out of proportion to the amounts received
by other persons having an equal claim to participate in the bounty of
the testator.""'' Once the contestant has established the presumption of
the existence of undue influence, the burden of proof shifts to the proponent.232
A majority of the courts, including Wyoming's, do not treat the
presumption of the exercise of undue influence as anything more than a
23
permissible inference. Justice Blume's opinion in In re Nelson's Estate11
discusses at length the effects of presumptions.2 35 In that case the court
refused to require a jury instruction that if they found certain facts the
burden of proof would shift to the proponent so that he would have to
come forward with evidence that at least balanced the contestant's. Under
the Wyoming Supreme Court's In re Nelson's Estate holding it appears
that the contestant who proves that the beneficiary participated in procuring the will should avoid having a verdict directed against him, but that
evidence doesn't compel a verdict for the contestant.""
227. kd at 46, 164 P. at 850.
228. Anderson's Estate, 71 Wyo. at 249,255 P.2d at 986, quoted with approval in Draper's
Estate, 374 P.2d at 431.
229. Brug, 600 P.2d at 715; Estate of Waters, 629 P.2d at 473.
230. Estate of Waters, 629 P.2d at 473.
231. 79 AM. JUR. 2D Wills, § 429.

232. Franciscan Sisters Health Care Corp. v. Dean, 95 Ill. 2d 452, 448 N.E.2d 872, 877
(1983).
233. W. PAGE, WILLS, § 29.85 (Bowe-Parker 1961).
234. 72 Wyo. at 483-88, 266 P.2d at 254-56.
235. Presumptions may either be of law or of fact. If the presumption is one of law, then
the jury must draw a particular inference once the circumstances raising the presumption
have been shown. Under a presumption of fact the jury may infer, from a fact that is proved,
a fact that is otherwise doubtful but the jury cannot be charged that it must, as a matter
of law, so find. The Wyoming Supreme Court has left open the door that under a certain
combination of facts, the inference to be drawn would be so strong as to treat it as a presumption of law. Nelson's Estate, 72 Wyo. at 487, 266 P.2d at 256.
236. Id. at 261.
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4. Effect of Suspicious Circumstances on Inter Vivos Transfers
Somewhat akin to the so-called presumption of undue influence in
testamentary instruments is the presumption raised by "suspicious circumstances" surrounding an inter vivos instrument. The burden of persuasion generally rests on the person challenging an inter vivos transfer
except in the case of gifts to strangers. Wyoming has adopted the position that when a parent delivers personalproperty to a child and the child
retains possession it is presumed that a gift is intended. 237 Only when the
parent's physical and mental condition is so weak as to make him susan inter
ceptible to undue influence, does the burden of proof to uphold
23
vivos transaction of personal property shift to the child.
The question of who bears the burden of proof in upsetting an inter
vivos conveyance of real property is not as clear. In one case the Wyoming Supreme Court held that once a dominant relationship had been
shown, the court would presume undue influence had been exerted and
that the burden was then imposed on the recipient of the transferred asset
239
to show "by clear and convincing proof" that the transaction was fair.
In subsequent opinions, however, the same court narrowed that holding.
In Brug v. Case,240 decided in 1979, the clear and convincing proof standard seems to apply only to the existence of a dominant relationship and
the activity of the influencer in procuring the deed.2 ' Once there is clear
proof of suspicious circumstances, a presumption of undue influence is
raised and a simple preponderance of the evidence will support a finding
of undue influence. Unfortunately, the court did not clearly define what
"suspicious circumstances" may be, but it appears that they include
activity by the influencer in the preparation or procuring of the deed. 24
5. Confidential and Dominant Relationships Defined
The concept of confidential relationships is important in both will contests and inter vivos transactions. Confidential relationships commonly
include fiduciary relationships, such as those which exist between an
237. In Re King's Estate, 49 Wyo. 453, 465, 57 P.2d 675, 678.
238. I.
239. Bergren v. Berggren, 77 Wyo. 438, 455, 317 P.2d 1101, 1107 (1957).
240. 600 P.2d 710 (Wyo. 1979). For a history of cases narrowing the Bergren holding,
see Brug, 600 P.2d at 714 n. 3. The Wyoming Supreme Court has apparently assumed the
same burden of proof would apply with respect to undue influence in a challenge of an inter
vivos transaction as applies to will contests. In many jurisdictions the burden of proof required
to raise a presumption of undue influence in wills is considerably more stringent than it is
with deeds. See Rein-Francovich, An Ounce of Prevention:Grounds for Upsetting Wills and
Will Substitutes, 20 GoNz. L. REV. 1 (1984).
241. Brug, 600 P.2d at 715.
242. Proof of a confidential or fiduciary relationship between the grantor and the grantee sufficed to shift the burden of showing fairness, good faith and lack of undue influence
to the grantees with respect to a deed in Baldwin, 346 P.2d at 280. In that case there were
two deeds, one prepared by the alleged influencer and the other by another attorney. Subsequently, in Zullig v. Zu~lig, 502 P.2d 198 (Wyo. 1972) the court included in the requirements
for shifting the burden that the influencer have exercised some activity in procuring the deed
or that the deed was without consideration. The opinion in Brug impliedly incorporates those
requirements into the suspicious circumstances test.
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attorney and client, ' conservator and ward, and trustee and beneficiary.
Also commonly held to be confidential are the relationships between doctor and patient, nurse and patient, and pastor and parishioner.
2
However, a confidential relationship in and of itself is not dispositive. "
It must be a dominant confidential relationship. A dominant relationship
may arise in two contexts, either as a matter of law,4 5 or as a question
of fact to be established by the evidence. In the first category are the relationships between trustee and cestui que trust, guardian and ward, attorney and client, principal and agent. In the second category are transactions
between parent16 and child or between a donor and a stranger.
While uncommon in other jurisdictions, there are two Wyoming cases
in which circumstances established a confidential, dominant relationship
between a husband and wife. This, in conjunction with other facts, created
a presumption of undue influence so that the contestant's burden of proof
was lessened." 7
6. Rebutting the Presumption of Undue Influence
Since Wyoming apparently does not shift the burden of persuasion
from the contestant to the proponent, but merely reduces the standard
of proof required of the contestant, it is logical that the evidence required
to rebut the so-called presumption of undue influence, once raised, varies
with the strength of the contestant's evidence supporting the presumption. Rebutting a presumption of undue influence generally requires evidence that the testator acted freely and voluntarily during the execution
of his will or deed. Such evidence could include: (1) the testator received
disinterested, competent advice independent of his beneficiaries before
executing his will or before making an inter vivos transaction;2"8 (2) the
disposition in question was essentially fair or the testator had good reasons for making the disposition;" 9 (3) the testator or grantor was remarkably alert and capable of transacting his own business;250 and (4) the
243. See York v. James, 62 Wyo. 184, 165 P.2d 109 (1946) (deed obtained by attorney,
grantee, from client set aside due to inadequate consideration).
244. Leseberg v. Lane, 369 P.2d 533, 535 (Wyo. 1962).
245. Bergren, 77 Wyo. at 455, 317 P.2d at 1107.
246. It should be noted that the dominant position of a child is not presumed from the
blood relationship alone. In fact in Wyoming for purposes of contesting a will or a deed on
grounds of undue influence, family relationships and friendships by themselves are not presumed to be dominant relationships. Zullig, 502 P.2d at 202 (family relationship); Matter
of Estate of Obra, 749 P.2d 272, 277 (Wyo. 1988) (friendship).
247. Brug, 600 P.2d at 710, involved a husband's deathbed deed of his ranch to his wife.
The supreme court found that the wife's uncontradicted active involvement in the procurement of the deed and as liaison between her husband and his attorneys, the evidence of her
husband's weakened condition, and the fact that she had been granted power of attorney
by her husband were clear proof of suspicious circumstances surrounding the husband/
grantor's deed of his ranch to his wife. Id at 715. Once the suspicious circumstances were
established the burden of proof shifted from clear proof to a mere preponderance. In a will
contest case, the evidence indicated that the testator, who was suffering from alcoholism,
was completely dependant upon his wife and under her domination at the time of the execution of his will. Water's Estate, 629 P.2d 470.
248. Leseberg, 369 P.2d at 536 (where the donor had the benefit of her own legal advice).
249. Id
250. Baldwin, 346 P.2d at 281.
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testator or grantor had an unhampered opportunity to revoke his will or
cancel the transaction subsequent to the alleged operation of undue
influence upon him, and either failed to do so or executed another will with
substantially the same terms.251
D. Testamentary Capacity
The Wyoming legislature has imposed two additional conditions on
testation. The testator must be of legal age and of sound mind.252 The age
requirement is defined at Wyoming Statutes section 14-1-101 .2" The
boundaries of testamentary capacity have been explored frequently by
Wyoming courts in will contests.
Wyoming courts have framed the requirements for sound mind as
follows:
Testator must have sufficient strength and clearness of mind and
memory, to know, in general, with prompting, the nature and
extent of the property of which he is about to dispose, and nature
of the act which he is about to perform, and the names and identity of the persons who are to be the objects of his bounty, and
his relation towards them. He must have sufficient mind and
memory to understand all of these facts, and to comprehend these
elements in their relation to each other, and a charge in negative
form, that capacity is lacking if testator is not about to know all
of these facts, is erroneous, since he lacks capacity if he is unable
to understand any one of them. He must be able to appreciate the
another, and to recollect the decirelation of these factors to2 one
54
sion which he has formed.
Wyoming only requires that the testator know these requisite elements
in a "general" way.255 Other states have insisted that the testator be able
to demonstrate an "intelligent" comprehension of these elements.256 One
commentator has noted that if a person had to have average intelligence
to make a will almost half of the population would be ineligible.257
The requirements of testamentary capacity can be minimal. In Morton, a testator, who was up until about six months before the execution
251. King's Estate,49 Wyo. at 464, 57 P.2d at 678 (intervivos gift); In re Wilson's Estate,

397 P.2d 805, 810 (Wyo. 1964) (subsequent will made). See also Draper'sEstate, 374 P.2d
425 where the testatrix apparently evidenced a continuity of purpose over several years regarding the bequests in the will which were alleged to evidence undue influence.
252. WYo. STAT. § 2-6-101 (1977, Rev. 1980).
253. WYo. STAT. § 14-1-101 (1977, Rey. 1986). In most states the age requirement is only
18. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-501 (1974). In Georgia it is 14. GA. CODE ANN.
§ 113-203 (1975 & Supp. 1988). Query whether a 14 year old domiciled in Wyoming, who
otherwise is of sound mind, could execute a valid will by going to Georgia and executing
the will in that state with the appropriate formalities required by that state. See WYo. STAT.
§ 2-6-116 (1977, Rev. 1980). This issue could be important where the minor holds a testamentary general power of appointment.
254. Estate of Morton, 428 P.2d at 729.

255. Id
256. See Epstein, Testamentary Capacity,Reasonablenessand Family Maintenance:A
Proposal for Meaningful Reform, 35 TEMp. L.Q. 231, 237 (1962).
257. DUKEMINIER AND JOHANSON, supra note 42, at 140.
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of the will always neat and tidy, underwent a complete change of personality, "physically and forgetfulness both. ' 2 Shortly after the execution
of the will, the testator was placed under the auspices of a guardianship,
largely on the recommendation of the doctor who felt that he "was not
able to physically take care of his affairs, and I felt he might not be using
the best judgment.' 29 The court held that
the evidence did not establish
260
mental incompetency to make a will.
1. Proving the Unsound Mind - Problems of Admissibility
The elements of testamentary capacity must be present at the time
the will is executed. 61 However, consideration of the testator's soundness
of mind is not confined to the time of execution. 6 Any and all conduct
of the testator is admissible in the discretion of the trial court to prove
testamentary capacity. 3 However, because evidence that is remote in time
lacks the probative weight of circumstantial evidence contemporaneous
with the execution ceremony, the courts generally restrict such evidence
to those statements
and acts of the testator which occur shortly before
26 4
or after execution.
Prior wills are generally admissible. A prior will that was executed
at a time when the testatrix's capacity was unquestioned, and was in substantial conformity with provisions of the contested will, was admitted
into evidence in Nelson.215 Even if the testatrix's capacity at the time of
execution is in issue, the will has been held admissible where it wasn't
freakish or abnormal and evidenced a pattern that the testatrix acted in
the same or similar manner at various stages of her life. 6 The court reasoned that if the testatrix acted in the same manner at various stages
of her life, when faced with the same basic facts, then the conduct is evidence that her mind was rational and normal at each stage and the evidentiary weight increases with the number of occurences in which the same
258. Estate of Morton, 428 P.2d at 730. During that period he would go out and come
back to his apartment unaware that his pants were soiled from voiding in public. He had
previously been a good checkers player but completely lost his ability. He had lost his grasp
of money. He knew what property he owned except he was mistaken about certain property
he had previously deeded to his wife's brother. He was admitted to the hospital just three
weeks prior to execution of the will but at that time the admitting physician found his mental condition to be good although he was suffering from arteriosclerosis. During the stay
in the hospital he threatened to sue the hospital and its attendants and to kill the nurse.
Some of the entries in his medical chart noted that he was in the first few days after admittance "lethargic," "confused" and "weaker and more malaise." However, in the week prior
to execution of the will the entries showed that he was "more alert" and was "talking more
clearly." The doctor also testified that he was undergoing a gradual aging process and that
the arteriosclerosis affected the brain but that he observed no "abnormal change" for a man
of the testator's age.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 734.
261. Estate of Roosa, 753 P.2d at 1032.

262. Branson, 52 Wyo. at 124, 70 P.2d at 598.
263. Faragher'sEstate, 367 P.2d at 975.

264. Estate of Carey, 504 P.2d at 798.
265. Nelson's Estate, 72 Wyo. at 488, 266 P.2d at 256.
266. Id at 463, P.2d at 257.
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state of mind is manifested. 267 If the prior will's provisions are inconsistent with the contested will at least one state has ruled that the contestant cannot introduce the prior will to prove the testator's lack of
testamentary capacity.268
2. The Shifting Burden of Persuasion - Testamentary Capacity
The contestant has the burden of proving the alleged incompetency
of the testator.269 However, that burden will shift to the proponent if the
is either admitted or sufficient evidence on
testator's prior incompetency
20
that point is introduced.

3. Presumptions or Inferences Which Affect Testamentary Capacity
Wyoming has adopted the general rule of presumption that a person
is sane and possesses testamentary capacity. 21 This presumption arises
upon proof of proper execution and attestation of the will. The effect is
to assign to the contestant the burden of showing, by a preponderance
272
of the evidence, that the testator lacked testamentary capacity.
Another presumption that affects testamentary capacity is the continuance of incapacity or insanity. If insanity of a general or permanent
nature is shown to have existed at one time, it is presumed to have continued until sufficient evidence is introduced to show a restoration of
sanity, or that the testator was competent at the time the will was
executed.,"
4. Effect of Guardianship Proceedings on Presumption of Sanity
Adjudications of insanity or guardianship proceedings may be admis-

sible for the purpose of defeating the presumption of sanity.274 The term

guardianship is a generic one. In 1985 Wyoming revised its statutory
scheme for guardianships. Wyoming now refers to the guardian of the
property or estate of the ward as a "conservator." The guardian of the
ward's person remains the "guardian." 2 ' The law recognizes that a per-

son may be able to manage his personal needs but requires a conservator
to manage his property. Likewise, an individual may be able to oversee
his financial affairs but is unable to care for himself physically and thus
a guardian is required. An individual may be subject to both a guardianship and a conservatorship but nevertheless be found to possess testamen267. Id See also Estateof Brosius, 683 P.2d at 665, where the court noted in a footnote
that the record contained evidence of two prior wills, neither of which included provisions
for the contestant who was also left out of the will finally admitted to probate.
268. O'Day v. Crabb, 269 Ill. 123, 109 N.E. 724 (1915). See also Annotation, Admissibility, on Issue of Testamentary Capacity, of Previously Executed Wills, 89 A.L.R. 2d 177

(1963).
269. Wood, 25 Wyo. at 50, 164 P. at 852.
270. Lane's Estate, 50 Wyo. at 135, 58 P.2d at 419.
271. Estate of Obra, 749 P.2d at 277.
272. Estate of Roosa, 753 P.2d at 1032.
273. Ingram's Estate, 384 P.2d at 1021.

274. See Merrill's Estate, 80 Wyo. at 283, 341 P.2d at 507, where the court assumed
but did not determine that guardianship proceedings were admissible evidence.
275. WYo. STAT. § 3-1-101 (1977, Rev. 1985).
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tary capacity. 27 6 Also, it remains possible, even where evidence is presented
of an individual's prior signs of incompetency or insanity, that attesting
witnesses' testimony
demonstrates the testator executed the will during
27 7

a "lucid interval.

A subsequent adjudication of incompetency can, but will not conclusively, raise a presumption of incompetency. If the presumption is raised
it causes the burden of proof to shift. The greater the time lapse between
a subsequent adjudication of incompentency or insanity and the execution of the will, the lesser the likelihood that such evidence will be admitted. If admitted its strength is diminished, which causes the burden of
persuasion to shift to the proponent.2 7 8 Furthermore, even if a subsequent
guardianship file contains admissible evidence, the entire file may be
excluded where it contains some inadmissible hearsay. 27 9 It appears that
this evidentiary problem can be solved by trial counsel's separation of
the wheat from the chaff, rather than expecting the trier of fact to do so. 260
5. Insane Delusions and Testamentary Capacity
Often claims of lack of testamentary capacity are coupled with assertions that the testator was mentally deranged. This derangement is sometimes referred to as "mental delusion" but is more frequently called an
"insane delusion. ' '28 1 To upset a will, the mental derangement must be
related to the testator's testamentary capacity. Thus, an insane delusion
will not prevent a finding of testamentary capacity unless it appears that
the objects of the delusion are those persons having a special claim to the
bounty of the testator.2 82
276. For example, Wyo. STAT. § 3-1-201 provides that the appointment of a guardian
or conservator does not constitute an adjudication that the ward lacks testamentary capacity or is of unsound mind. See also Estate of Roosa, 753 P.2d at 1037; Estate of Morton,
428 P.2d at 733.
277. For example, where the evidence showed that the testator had been placed under
a Veteran's Guardianship under Wyo. STAT. §§ 3-6-101 through 3-6-119 three years prior
to executing his will and that his behavior was eccentric and delusional, the court nevertheless sustained a summary judgment verdict on the testimony of the attesting witnesses,
two attorneys, that on the day he executed the will he appeared "lucid and well oriented."
Estate of Roosa, 753 P.2d at 1032. The witnesses for the contestants testified that the testator
lived in a dream world; thought he was a partner in a business that he had no interest in
and attempted to contribute money to it; told people he was working for the Attorney General
of the United States; solicited help from individuals, apparently in connection with his
imagined duties as a guard, to prevent aliens from coming across the border. Id at 1033.
278. For example, a subsequent adjudication of insanity was admissible and resulted
in shifting the burden of proof where it occurred two days after the execution of the will
and was accompanied by evidence of testator's bizarre and dangerous acts immediately prior
to signing the will. Ingram's Estate, 384 P.2d at 1021. See Admissibility of Evidence on
Question of Testamentary Capacityor UndueInfluence in a will contest as affected by remoteness, relative to the Time that the Will was Executed, of the Facts or Events to which the
Evidence Relates, 124 A.L.R. 433.
279. Estate of Carey, 504 P.2d at 799.
280. Estate of Morton, 428 P.2d at 731-32. In this case, the court refused to admit the
hospital records or the guardianship file but the contestant was allowed to introduce selected
portions of those files, such as an extract of the petition for appointment of a guardian. The
disallowed exhibits were regarded as merely cumulative, and therefore there was no error
in excluding their introduction into evidence.
281. Faragher'sEstate, 367 P.2d at 977.
282. Estate of Roosa, 753 P.2d at 1032.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol24/iss2/8

42

Warnick: The Ungrateful Living: An Estate Planner's Nightmare - The Trial
1989

THE UNGRATEFUL LIVING

Mere prejudice and bias do not rise to the level of an insane delusion.28 3
It must be a false belief which no sane person in the testator's circumstances would entertain. Thus, if the testator's belief is based upon evidence, 2no
matter how slight and inconclusive, it cannot be an insane de4
lusion.

In Matterof Estate of Obra,28 5 the testator was a Philippine immigrant

who began residing in Wyoming sixty years before his death. Almost ten
years before his death he executed a will leaving his estate to some apparent relatives. Then approximately a year before he passed away he called
up a friend and told him that "all of his relatives were deceased and that
he had nobody to leave his property and to pick up his will as it was no
good anymore." Shortly thereafter he executed a will leaving all his estate
to his former employer. The court found that the testator was either mistaken or estranged by inattention and that such mistake, uncoupled with
any other evidence of irregularities such as false representations or that
the mistaken conception was an insane
28 delusion, did not establish that
testamentary capacity was lacking.
It appears that the court in Obra was influenced by the fact that the
testator may have naturally concluded that his relatives were all deceased
because he had no contact with them,'2 7 although the record apparently
lacked any explanation for the revocation of the prior will other than the
belief expressed to his acquaintance at the time he instructed him to pick
the will up from the attorney. In essence the court recognized that the
testator's mistaken belief concerning the death of his relatives did not
establish lack of testamentary capacity. A different result might have been
reached, however, if the revoking will had contained an erroneous statement that the prior legatees were dead and that this was why the testator was revoking that instrument. 88
Medical testimony alone is not always sufficient to establish the exis8 0
tence of an insane delusion.2 8 9 In In re Johnston'sEstate,"
the Wyoming
Supreme Court held that a medically unsound mind may be legally sound.
In that case the testatrix had been diagnosed as suffering from paranoia
and the expert medical testimony concluded that this mental condition
was incurable. 29 1 The proponents successfully countered that medical testimony with numerous lay witnesses who testified that for many years,
283. Johnston's Estate, 63 Wyo. at 347, 181 P.2d at 617.
284. Id
285. 749 P.2d 272 (Wyo. 1988).
286. Id at 277.
287. The Obra opinion offers this advice to distant relatives:" 'If you want the old codger
to remember you by will, keep in close touch,' for in fact, as with older ages of relatives,
'absence does not make the heart grow fonder.' Attention, as the elderly have little else,
may not be something-it is near everything." Id
288. See Gifford v. Dyer, 2 R.I. 99 1852) and Comment, Proof and Effect of Mistake
as to the Provisions of Wills, 38 Mo. L. REV. 48 (1973).
289. For an excellent discussion of the legal and medical definitions of insanity, mental
deficiency and mental derangement see Rein-Francovich, supra note 240, at 17-27.
290. 63 Wyo. at 348, 181 P.2d at 617.
291. Id.
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up to and including the time she executed her will, she was of a "sound
and disposing mind and memory" and "careful in business matters." The
contestants failed to convince the court that the delusion produced by
the paranoia directly influenced the terms of the will.2 92
The more persistent the belief in the supposed facts about one's family,
which have no real existence except in the deranged testator's mind, and
the more pervasive the conduct which such an insane delusion excites,
the more likely it is that the trier of fact will be convinced that the delusion eroded an otherwise apparently sensible individual's testamentary
capacity. Thus, even though the testatrix was clearly able to manage her
own property, a will which left one dollar each to her brothers and sisters
and nieces and nephews and most of the balance of her estate to a foundation to be created for the benefit of the blind, was not admitted to probate.293 The evidence showed that the testatrix's father and brother were
insane, that she had tried to commit suicide in a fit of despondency, that
she lost her sight, believed that her mother was not her true mother and
that her brothers and sisters were of the half blood, had extreme fits of
anger, believed her relatives were trying to poison her, and that shortly
before the execution of the will she stayed in a car without food for a full
day and night out of fear of being poisoned.2 94 But if there is any connecfamily memtion between the delusion the testator harbors against2 9his
5
bers and reality, testamentary capacity will be found.
E. Fraud,Duress, and Forgery
A will purportedly executed by an individual with sufficient testamentary capacity may still fail if a contestant can show that it is the product
of duress or forgery. Provisions of a properly attested will, or the will itself,
may fail if they are the product of fraud.2 9
Fraud occurs where there is an intentional, deceitful misrepresenta297
tion made with the purpose of altering the testamentary disposition.
The fraud may be in the inducement or in the execution. The outcome of
the will contest will vary according to the nature of the fraud and its pervasiveness.
When a person misrepresents facts and the testator is influenced
thereby in making or revoking a testamentary disposition there has been
292. Id 343, P.2d at 614.
293. Branson, 52 Wyo. at 106, 70 P.2d at 591.
294. Id at 594-95.

295. InBe Estate of Edwards, 433 So. 2d 1349 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) where the testator's distrust of his family arose out of his concern over shoplifting in his business and the
fact that some of his family members had entered his property without his permission during one of his hospital stays.
296. The ability to challenge a will or a probate decree procured by fraud is affected by
statutory limitation periods for contesting a will or its probate. The fraudulent conduct may
toll the statute of limitations. See Fraudas Extending StatutoryLimitations Periodfor Contesting Will or Its Probate,48 A.L.R. 4TH 1094 (1986).
297. See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 42, at 345-46.
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fraud in the inducement. Courts will strike down the fraudulently induced
inheritance if the testator would not have left the inheritance or made the
bequest if he had known the true facts. 29 The balance of the will stands
unless it is shown that fraud affects the entire will or the fraudulently
induced bequest cannot be separated from the rest of the will.
Fraud in the execution occurs when someone misrepresents the contents or nature of a will and in reliance on that representation the testator signs the instrument. For example, if the testator signs a will, a portion
of which was prior to execution removed without the testator's knowledge
and another portion inserted, this would constitute fraud in the execution. In this case the balance of the document will stand and a constructive trust will be imposed on the interest received by the wrongdoer as
a result of the fraud.2

99

This must be distinguished from the case where

the testator, without another's intervention, executes a different person's
will. In that case, the will generally will not be admitted to probate. 00°
Another species of fraud is the forged will or codicil. Some states have
a specific statute of limitations dealing with wills which have been forged
or fraudulently induced.30 1 Wyoming only has a general statute of limitations which deems the probate of the will to be conclusive if no action
to set aside the will is filed during that period,3 0 2 and a curative statute
which has been interpreted to apply only to non-jurisdictional procedural
flaws. 03
In a recent case an individual forged a will which purported to appoint
him as personal representative and to leave all of his mother's assets in
excess of $20,000 to him. 04 The forged document was admitted to probate and distribution was made under the terms of the forged document.
Fifteen years later the forger died. During the administration of his estate
a creditor's claim was filed in the forger's probate estate; however, it failed
to specifically raise a charge of fraud. The creditor's claim was rejected
and an untimely suit was filed against the forger's estate, based on the
rejected claim, and also against the distributees of the estate alleging that
the forger's conduct had prevented the plaintiff, the forger's brother, from
receiving his proper share of their mother's assets. The plaintiff further
alleged that the forger had promised but failed to provide for the plaintiff in his will. The distributees of the forger's estate relied upon the defense
of the four-year statute of limitations for fraud,30 5 and the estate raised
298. ATKINSON, WILLS

§ 56 (2d ed. 1953).

299. 76 AM. Jun. 2D Trusts § 247 (1975).
300. But see In re Snide, 52 N.Y.2d 193, 418 N.E.2d 656 (1981). Mistake in the execution is discussed extensively in Comment, Proof and Effect of Mistake as to the Provisions
of Wills, 38 Mo. L. REV. 48 (1973).
301. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-1106 (1974) (two years after discovery but not more
than five years after commission of fraud); TEX. PRos. CODE ANN. § 93 (Vernon 1980) (two

years after discovery).
302. WYo. STAT. § 2-6-306 (1977 & Cum. Supp. 1988).
303. WYo. STAT. § 2-2-111 (1977, Rev. 1980). See Addison v. Fleenor, 65 Wyo. 119, 196
P.2d 991 (1948).
304. Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 719 P.2d 234 (Wyo. 1986).
305. WYo. STAT. § 1-3-105(a)(iv)(D) (1977, Rev. 1988).
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the bar of the probate statute of limitations for rejected claims."" The
Wyoming Supreme Court held that the distributees were not barred by
the doctrine of equitable estoppel from raising the statute of limitationssince there was no evidence that the forger had done anything to prevent
the claimant from discovering the forgery and raising the issue of fraud
during the prior probate proceeding.307 It also held that the statute of limitations began to run when the claimant could have reasonably discovered
the forgery, which was when the document was admitted to probate. Since
more than four years had elapsed since the forged will was admitted to
probate both the fraud and creditor claims were time-barred.30 8
F. Tral Strategy

In a will contest, the first decision is whether to ask for a jury trial.
Statistics compiled in California indicate that when mental capacity or
undue influence were at issue, the jury found for the contestants in
seventy-seven percent of the cases. Ultimately, more than half of the verdicts for the contestants were reversed by the California Supreme Court
on the grounds of insufficient evidence. 0 9 In Wyoming five out of nine
jury cases involving testamentary capacity or undue influence issues
resulted in verdicts for the will contestant, while only twenty percent of
the will contest cases on the same issues
which were tried to the court
3 10
resulted in verdicts for the contestant.
On appeal the court will give the successful party's evidence every
favorable inference that can be drawn therefrom.31' It is therefore essential to build a solid prima facie case at trial. In asserting undue influence
the contestant must accentuate the odious conduct of the alleged
influencer. In dealing with testamentary capacity, it is not sufficient to
rely solely on hypothetical post-mortem expert testimony. Such testimony
must be buttressed with the testimony of as many close associates of the
306. WYo. STAT. § 2-7-718 provides that the suit on a rejected claim must be brought
within thirty days after the mailing of the notice of rejection. In this case, the plaintiff waited
almost eleven months before filing suit.
307. Taylor, 719 P.2d at 239-40.
308. Id at 239.
309. Note, Will Contests on Tria, 6 STAN. L. REv. 91, 92 (1953).
310. The following cases resulted in a jury verdict for the contestant: Cook v. Bolduc,
24 Wyo. 281, 157 P. 580; Branson v. Roelofsz, 52 Wyo. 101, 70 P.2d 589; Merrill's Estate,
80 Wyo. 276, 341 P.2d 506; Faragher'sEstate,367 P.2d 972; Estate of Waters, 629 P.2d 470.
The following cases resulted in a jury verdict for the will's proponents: Wood, 25 Wyo.
26, 164 P. 844; Lane's Estate,50 Wyo. 119, 58 P.2d 415; Nelson's Estate, 72 Wyo. 444, 266
P.2d 238; Estate of Morton, 428 P.2d 725.
Draper'sEstate, 374 P.2d 425, was tried to a jury but resulted in a hung jury. The court
finally entered an order admitting the will to probate.
Conroy's Estate, 29 Wyo. 62, 211 P. 96, and Ingram's Estate, 384 P.2d 1021, both
resulted in bench verdicts denying admission of the wills to probate. Bench verdicts or summary judgments in favor of the will's proponents were entered in Johnston'sEstate, 63 Wyo.
332, 181 P.2d 611; Anderson's Estate,71 Wyo. 238, 255 P.2d 983; Wilson's Estate,397 P.2d
805; Estate of Carey, 504 P.2d 793; Estate of Brosius, 683 P.2d 663; Estate of Obra, 749
P.2d 272; Estate of Roosa, 753 P.2d 1032; May v. Estate of McCormick, slip op., No. 88-319,
Wyo. Feb. 27, 1989).
311. Merrill's Estate, 80 Wyo. at 284, 341 P.2d at 508.
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testator as possible. If there has been a guardianship proceeding it is
important to underscore the reasons for the proceeding so as to shift the
3 12
burden of proof to the will's proponent.
Contestant's counsel should be sensitive to the weight of his burden:
the law and the public have an aversion to "greedy heirs." To overcome
the stigma of the "ungrateful living," the contestant should be portrayed,
as the facts will permit, as the caring relative of the deceased. Not only
will this be an important psychological point at trial, but on appeal the
courts seem to be influenced by the close contact of the relatives to the
3 13
testator, as opposed to sole reliance on lineage.
Counsel should carefully review the facts and circumstances concerning execution or possible revocation of the will. Wyoming recognizes the
validity of a will that was executed in any state so long as its execution
satisfies the formalities of state law at the place of testator's domicile,
either at death or at the time of execution. If valid at the time and place
of execution it remains valid when probated in Wyoming.", If proof of
due execution can be defeated, the presumption of the will's validity and
the court's policy arguments favoring freedom of testation do not become
factors. Revocation may open the door for the contestants to probate a
prior will, if intent to do so is shown, 11 or it may at least throw the probate into intestacy.
IV.

DEFENDING THE WILL CONTEST

"You Can't Go Back and You Can't Stand Still"
The Grateful Dead
A. Draftsman as Defense Attorney?
One mistake that the shortsighted, or perhaps shorthanded, scrivener
makes, is to act as an attesting witness. This creates an ethical dilemma
as the draftsman will undoubtedly be called to testify at trial to establish
proof of due execution and, as is customary, will expect to serve as attorney for the personal representative. Under Rule 3.7 of the Wyoming Rules
for Professional Conduct a "lawyer is not to act as advocate at a trial in
which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness except where... disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the

client. "316
The South Dakota Supreme Court has emphatically stated that it is
a "grave breach" of the attorney's ethical duties to testify when he also
312. Id. at 510. The trial counsel apparently successfully influenced the jury by repeatedly using the term "incompetent" to refer to the testatrix whose physical condition, rather
than mental, required a guardianship to manage her property.
313. See Estate of Obra, 749 P.2d 272; Estate ofBrosius, 683 P.2d 663, two recent cases
where the Wyoming Supreme Court apparently took cognizance of the estrangement between
the testator and his blood relatives.
314. WYo. STAT. § 2-6-116 (1977, Rev. 1980). See Estate of Campbel 673 P.2d 645. Counsel
should carefully examine the statutes of the foreign jurisdictions.
315. Wilson's Estate, 397 P.2d 805.
316. Wyo. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.7.
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acts as advocate for the will's proponent. 17 Kentucky on the other hand18
has found that it is proper for the draftsman to represent the proponent.1
While Wyoming has not expressly ruled on the ethical propriety of the
draftsman/attesting witness serving as attorney for the estate, it has held
that the fact that the attesting witness isbeing paid a fee for serving as
the estate's attorney does not disquality her as a witness.31 It would seem
that the estate's inability to have the draftsman/attesting witness serve
as trial counsel, imposes insufficient hardship to justify the attorney's
role as both witness and advocate. This is particularly true considering
the fact that the attorney can continue to handle the routine administrative matters, while delegating to a litigator outside of his firm the duties
of trial counsel.32 0 Ethical considerations require 3that
the litigator be
21
unconnected with the witness/attorney's law firm.
Another thorny issue raised by the advocate/witness situation, is
whether the draftsman can testify since the attorney/client privilege would
bar his testimony if the testator were still alive. In one will contest case,
the issue was apparently raised but the Wyoming Supreme Court did not
address the fact that the attorney had been allowed to testify.322 Courts
usually admit such testimony in will contests on the theory that the testator intended the privilege only to last during his lifetime. 323 Alternatively,
such testimony can be admitted on the theory that the personal represen32 4
tative, as the legal representative of the testator, can waive the privilege.
Another argument would be that the privilege is a statutory privilege
intended to apply only to civil matters and does not extend to a probate
32 5
matter since it is not incorporated into the Wyoming Probate Code. It
should also be noted that some courts have allowed a draftsman, who also
served as attesting witness, to testify on the theory that by asking the
draftsman to serve
as a witness the testator is deemed to have waived
326
the privilege.
B. First Things First-The Prima Facie Case
Once a will contest petition is filed, counsel for the proponent should
file a reply. While it is unclear at this point that an answer is required,
failure to file an answer will bring up the needless exercise of defending
a motion for default judgment by the contestant.2 7 The next step is to
317. In re Estate of Evans, 90 S.D. 126, 238 N.W.2d 677, 679 (1976).
318. Adams v. Flora, 445 S.W.2d 420, 422 (Ky. 1969).
319. Lane's Estate,50 Wyo. at 140, 58 P.2d at 420-21. But the result might be different
if the attorney were also a beneficiary under the will. See Wvo. STAT. § 2-6-112 and Matter
of Estate of Campbell, 673 P.2d 645 (Wyo. 1983).
320. This appears to be the course chosen by the draftsman inEstateof Roosa, 753 P.2d
at 1028.
321. Wyo. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.7 (comment).
322. Lane's Estate, 50 Wyo. at 140, 58 P.2d at 421.

323. 8 J.

WIOMORE, EVIDENCE

§ 234 (McNaughton rev. 1961).

324. See Annotation, Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege by PersonalRepresentative
or Heir of Deceased Client or By Guardianor Incompetent, 67 A.L.R. 2D 1268 (1959).
325. WYO.STAT. § 1-12-101 (1977, Rev. 1988).
326. In re Estate of Coons, 154 Neb. 690, 48 N.W.2d 778 (1952).
327. WYo. STAT. § 2-6-302 (1977, Rev. 1980).
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prepare to show that all of the required formalities were observed in the
execution of the will. In conjunction with that effort the attorney should
prepare affidavits, based on the testimony of the attesting witnesses, that
the will was duly executed and that the testator possessed the requisite
testamentary capacity. These affidavits should be filed along with a
motion for summary judgment relying on the presumptions of sanity and
possession of testamentary capacity that arise once proper execution and
attestation have been proven."2 8 Finally, counsel should initiate discovery so as to discover the basis for the contestant's case and prepare his
rebuttal.
C. Using the Testator's Declarations
The testator's declarations can be extremely helpful in proving proper
execution and testamentary capacity, and showing lack of undue influence
or fraud. However, these statements, if offered32to9 show the truth of the
matter asserted, will often be deemed hearsay.
If the testator's declarations are made contemporaneous with the execution of the will then they are generally deemed admissible since the statement was made as part of the res gestae 3" Thus, they can be used to show
that the testator understood the will's provisions"' and that it was duly
executed.332 However, if the testator's declarations are not made contemporaneously, then they are inadmissible except when offered to show the
testator's mental state or susceptibility to duress, undue influence, etc. 33
Likewise, such statements may be admitted to show the testator's intent
regarding the disposition of his property 334 or his relations with and feelings towards friends or relatives. 3 5 However, they may not be used to
show due execution of the will if not made as part of res gestae 36 Even
if the testator's declarations are deemed to be hearsay, counsel should
be mindful of the exceptions to the hearsay rule that may overcome the
contestant's hearsay objection. 7

328. See Estate of Roosa, 753 P.2d at 1037, where a summary judgment was affirmed
despite affidavits filed by the contestant which showed that the testator lacked capacity
to sign a will. The court pointed out that the contestant's affidavits did not specifically relate
to the date of execution of the will and therefore didn't "directly refute" the affidavits of
the proponent.
329. See generally E.

CLEARY, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE

§ 246

(2d ed. 1972).
330. Nelson's Estate, 72 Wyo. at 473, 266 P.2d at 249.
331. InRe Lane's Estate (Lane's Estate II), 50 Wyo. 119, 150, 60 P.2d 360, 362 (Wyo.
1936).
332. Throckmorton v. Hill, 180 U.S. 552 (1901). See generally Note, In a Will Contest,
When and for What PurposeAre the Statements of the TestatorAdmissible? 11 VA.L. REV.

601, 601-06 (1925).
333. Note, Testamentary Hearsay, 38

HARV. L. REV.

959, 960 (1925).

334. Estate of Morton, 428 P.2d at 732.
335. Estate of Obra, 749 P.2d at 277.
336. Throckmorton, 180 U.S. at 572.

337. Wyo. R. EVID. 803.
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D. Use of Experts
The choice of witnesses, both lay and expert, is critical to the defense
of the will. In early Wyoming cases the courts gave little extra deference
to medical testimony. In fact, one court held that nonexperts may be
equally able to form conclusions concerning the testator's mental state
as experts."' Later cases, however, recognized the danger of relying upon
nonexpert opinion testimony on testamentary capacity. "' If the expert
testimony comes from the testator's personal physician who has had a
longstanding relationship with the patient, the trier of fact may attach
greater weight to such testimony than that of a clinical psychologist who
is conducting a post-mortem diagnosis based on his review of the testator's medical records 40 Clearly, the modem trend favors expert testimony
although the trier of fact will be careful not4 to let experts express an opinion as to the ultimate issue of the case. 1
E. To Appeal or Not to Appeal
In Wyoming the odds are greatly stacked against the will contestant
for all of the reasons discussed above. If after trial the contestant is unsuccessful, he and his counsel must seriously consider the advisability of an
appeal. Formerly, the contestant not only had to evaluate the cost of pursuing an appeal but he also had to be prepared to pay for the appellee's
attorney fees even if the appeal proved to be meritorious. "' Under the
liability for
new Wyoming Probate Code,"'2 the unsuccessful contestant's
4
fees and expenses is limited to the costs incurred.1
The most persuasive reason for the will contestant to forego appeal
is that only two verdicts have been reversed, and both of those were verdicts in favor of the contestant." 45 The presumptions which favor the will's
proponents should make an appeal by an unsuccessful proponent more
attractive.
VII. CONCLUSION
"Nothin' Left To Do But Smile Smile Smile"
The Grateful Dead
The tactics and defenses suggested in this article are clearly not a substitute for a testator of sound mind who is impervious to influence from
any source. However, the skillful use of these defensive techniques can
338. Johnston's Estate, 63 Wyo. at 349, 181 P.2d at 618.
339. Merrill's Estate,80 Wyo. at 286,341 P.2d at 508; Estateof Carey, 504 P.2d at 798-99.
340. Faragher'sEstate, 367 P.2d at 975.
341. Estate of Carey, 504 P.2d at 798-99.

342. Merrill's Estate, 80 Wyo. at 292, 341 P.2d at 511.
343. WYo. STAT. § 2-6-305 (1977, Rev. 1980).
344. Estate of Croft, 734 P.2d 59.

345. Wood, 25 Wyo. at 52, 164 P. at 852; Merrill'sEstate,80 Wyo. at 292-93, 341 P.2d
511. The Wyoming experience is similar to the trend reported in the State of Wisconsin,
where in undue influence cases the appellate courts rarely reverse the trial court decision.
See Note, Undue Influence-JudicialImplementation of Social Policy, 1968 Wis. L. REv. 569.
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be an effective antidote to the emotional and financial disappointment
heirs experience when they discover the 'ol geezer has deprived them of
their birthright. Even if the heirs are not persuaded that the defensive
walls the estate planner assisted the testator in building are impregnable, trial counsel's job will be made easier because of efforts to preserve
and document the testator's capacity and freedom from influence.
When the attorney has skillfully drafted the will, religiously observed
the formalities of execution with the assistance of a checklist, and gathered
and preserved evidence to corroborate the testator's mental capacity, the
client will appreciate those efforts, even if his heirs do not.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1989

51

